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Abstract
Genetic algorithms (GAs) are a class of optimization algorithms. GAs attempt to solve
problems through modeling a simplified version of genetic processes. There are many
problems for which a GA approach is useful. It is, however, undetermined if cryptanalysis
is such a problem.
Therefore, this work explores the use of GAs in cryptography. Both traditional crypt
analysis and GA-based methods are implemented in software. The results are then com
pared using the metrics of elapsed time and percentage of successful decryptions. A de
termination is made for each cipher under consideration as to the validity of the GA-based
approaches found in the literature. In general, these GA-based approaches are typical of
the field.
Of the genetic algorithm attacks found in the literature, totaling twelve, seven were
re-implemented. Of these seven, only three achieved any success. The successful attacks
were those on the transposition and permutation ciphers by Matthews [20], Clark [4], and
Griindlingh and Van Vuuren [13], respectively. These attacks were further investigated in
an attempt to improve or extend their success. Unfortunately, this attempt was unsuccessful,
as was the attempt to apply the Clark [4] attack to the monoalphabetic substitution cipher
and achieve the same or indeed any level of success.
Overall, the standard fitness equation genetic algorithm approach, and the scoreboard
variant thereof, are not worth the extra effort involved. Traditional cryptanalysis methods
are more successful, and easier to implement. While a traditional method takes more time,
a faster unsuccessful attack is worthless. The failure of the genetic algorithm approach
indicates that supplementary research into traditional cryptanalysis methods may be more
useful and valuable than additional modification ofGA-based approaches.
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Glossary
block
block length
chromosome
cipher
ciphertext
crossover (mating)
cryptanalysis
cryptography
cryptosystem
decryption
digram
encryption
A sequence of consecutive characters encoded at one
time
The number of characters in a block
The genetic material of a individual represents the in
formation about a possible solution to the given problem
An algorithm for performing encryption (and the reverse,
decryption) a series of well-defined steps that can be
followed as a procedure. Works at the level of individual
letters, or small groups of letters
A text in the encrypted form produced by some cryp
tosystem. The convention is for ciphertexts to contain no
white space or punctuation
Crossover is the process by which two chromosomes
combine some portion of their genetic material to pro
duce a child or children
The analysis and deciphering of cryptographic writings
or systems
The process or skill of communicating in or deciphering
secret writings or ciphers
The package of all processes, formulae, and instructions
for encoding and decoding messages using cryptography
Any procedure used in cryptography to convert cipher-
text (encrypted data) into plaintext
Sequence of two consecutive characters
The process of putting text into encoded form
fitness
generation
genetic algorithm (GA)
key
key length
monoalphabetic
mutation
one-time pad
order-based GA
plaintext
polyalphabetic
The extent to which a possible solution successfully
solves the given problem - usually a numerical value
The average interval of time between the birth of parents
and the birth of their offspring - in the genetic algorithm
case, this is one iteration of the main loop of code
Search/optimization algorithm based on the mechanics
of natural selection and natural genetics
A relatively small amount of information that is used by
an algorithm to customize the transformation of plaintext
into ciphertext (during encryption) or vice versa (during
decryption)
The size of the key - how many values comprise the key
Using one alphabet - refers to a cryptosystem where each
alphabetic character is mapped to a unique alphabetic
character
Simulation of transcription errors that occur in nature
with a low probability - a child is randomly changed from
what its parents produced in mating
Another name for the Vernam cipher
A form of GA where the chromosomes represent per
mutations. Special care must be taken to avoid illegal
permutations
A message before encryption or after decryption, i.e., in
its usual form which anyone can read, as opposed to its
encrypted form
Using many alphabets refers to a cipher where each al
phabetic character can be mapped to one ofmany possi
ble alphabetic characters
VI
population
scoreboard
trigram
unigram
Vigenere
The possible solutions (chromosomes) currently under
investigation, as well as the number of solutions that can
be investigated at one time, i.e., per generation
Method of determining the fitness of a possible solution
takes a small list of the most common digrams and tri-
grams and gives each chromosome a score based on how
often these combinations occur
Sequence of three consecutive characters
Single character
The specific polyalphabetic substitution cipher used in
this work
vn
Chapter 1
Introduction
The application of a genetic algorithm (GA) to the field of cryptanalysis is rather unique.
Few works exist on this topic. This nontraditional application is investigated to determine
the benefits of applying a GA to a cryptanalytic problem, if any. If the GA-based approach
proves successful, it could lead to faster, more automated cryptanalysis techniques. How
ever, since this area is so different from the application areas where GAs developed, the
GA-based methods will likely prove to be less successful than the traditional methods.
The primary goals of this work are to produce a performance comparison between
traditional cryptanalysis methods and genetic algorithm based methods, and to determine
the validity of typical GA-based methods in the field of cryptanalysis.
The focus will be on classical ciphers, including substitution, permutation, transposi
tion, knapsack and Vernam ciphers. The principles used in these ciphers form the founda
tion for many of the modem cryptosystems. Also, if a GA-based approach is unsuccessful
on these simple systems, it is unlikely to be worthwhile to apply a GA-based approach to
more complicated systems. A thorough search of the available literature found GA-based
attacks on only these ciphers. In many cases, these ciphers are some of the simplest pos
sible versions. For example, one of the knapsack systems attacked is the Merkle-Hellman
knapsack scheme. In this scheme, a superincreasing sequence of length n is used as a pub
lic key. According to Shamir [23], a typical value for n is 100. In the GA-based attacks on
this cipher, n was less than 16. This is almost an order of magnitude below the typical case,
and makes these attacks useful only as proof-of-concept examples for learning the use of
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GAs.
In otherGA-based attacks, there is a huge gap in the knowledge needed to re-implement
the attack and the information provided in the paper. For example, the values ofp and h are
vitally necessary for an implementation of the Chor-Rivest knapsack scheme. This system
utilizes a finite field, q, of characteristic p, where q = ph,p > h, and the discrete logarithm
problem is feasible. In the GA-based attack on this cipher, these values are not provided.
This information hole means that this attack could have been mn using trivia] parameters,
or parameters known to be easy to attack. This attack can not be considered remotely valid
without knowing these parameters.
Many of the GA-based attacks also lack information required for comparison to the tra
ditional attacks. The number of generations it took for a run of the GA to get to some state
is not at all useful when attempting to compare and contrast attacks. The most coherent
and seemingly valid attacks were re-implemented so that a consistent, reasonable set of
metrics could be collected. These metrics include elapsed time required for the attack and
the success percentage of each attack.
1.1 Document Overview
This thesis is broken into a number of chapters. Each chapter covers one aspect of the thesis
in detail. Chapter 2 gives a brief introduction to genetic algorithms. The general form of
the selection, reproduction and mutation operators are discussed, as is the general sequence
of events for a GA-based approach. Chapter 3 introduces the necessary classical ciphers in
detail. The algorithm for each cipher is given, in some cases including a small example to
illustrate the process of using the given cryptosystem.
The next two chapters cover the different attacks found in the literature. Chapter 4 dis
cusses the various GA-based attacks in detail. These attacks are covered in chronological
order, with up to four papers attacking the same cipher or variants thereof. The following
chapter, Chapter 5, details the classical attack on those ciphers chosen for further investiga
tion. The ciphers were selected for further investigation due to the difficulty or lack thereof
of the traditional attack method, as well as the clarity and quality of the GA-based work.
For example, the Vernam cipher was not selected for further investigation. This cipher is
unconditionally secure, meaning that an attack is successful only when there is a protocol
or implementation failure. There is no basis for attacking this cipher when no mistakes
have been made.
The next chapters detail the results of the traditional and GA-based attacks, as well as
extensions to the GA-based attacks. Chapter 6 covers the results of the traditional attacks,
and discusses those GA-based attacks that achieved some success. Chapter 7 discusses the
extensions made to several of the GA-based attacks, as well as new work attempted.
Finally, Chapter 8 discusses the overall conclusions drawn from this work, as well as
any other directions that need further investigation.
Chapter 2
Genetic Algorithms
The genetic algorithm is a search algorithm based on the mechanics of natural selection
and natural genetics [12]. As summarized by Tomassini [29], the main idea is that in order
for a population of individuals to adapt to some environment, it should behave like a natu
ral system. This means that survival and reproduction of an individual is promoted by the
elimination of useless or harmful traits and by rewarding useful behavior. The genetic algo
rithm belongs to the family of evolutionary algorithms, along with genetic programming,
evolution strategies, and evolutionary programming. Evolutionary algorithms can be con
sidered as a broad class of stochastic optimization techniques. An evolutionary algorithm
maintains a population of candidate solutions for the problem at hand. The population is
then evolved by the iterative application of a set of stochastic operators. The set of opera
tors usually consists of mutation, recombination, and selection or something very similar.
Globally satisfactory, if sub-optimal, solutions to the problem are found in much the same
way as populations in nature adapt to their surrounding environment.
Using Tomassini 's terms [29], genetic algorithms (GAs) consider an optimization prob
lem as the environment where feasible solutions are the individuals living in that environ
ment. The degree of adaptation of an individual to its environment is the counterpart of the
fitness function evaluated on a solution. Similarly, a set of feasible solutions takes the place
of a population of organisms. An individual is a string of binary digits or some other set of
symbols drawn from a finite set. Each encoded individual in the population may be viewed
as a representation of a particular solution to a problem.
In general, a genetic algorithm begins with a randomly generated set of individuals.
Once the initial population has been created, the genetic algorithm enters a loop [29]. At
the end of each iteration, a new population has been produced by applying a certain num
ber of stochastic operators to the previous population. Each such iteration is known as a
generation [29].
A selection operator is applied first. This creates an intermediate population of n "par
ent"individuals. To produce these "parents", n independent extractions of an individual
from the old population are performed [29]. The probability of each individual being ex
tracted should be (linearly) proportional to the fitness of that individual. This means that
above average individuals should have more copies in the new population, while below
average individuals should have few to no copies present, i.e., a below average individual
risks extinction.
Once the intermediate population of "parents" (those individuals selected for reproduc
tion) has been produced, the individuals for the next generation will be created through the
application of a number of reproduction operators [29]. These operators can involve one or
more parents. An operator that involves just one parent, simulating asexual reproduction,
is called a mutation operator. When more than one parent is involved, sexual reproduction
is simulated, and the operator is called recombination [29]. The genetic algorithm uses two
reproduction operators - crossover and mutation.
To apply a crossover operator, parents are paired together. There are several differ
ent types of crossover operators, and the types available depend on what representation
is used for the individuals. For binary string individuals, one-point, two-point, and uni
form crossover are often used. For permutation or order-based individuals, order, partially
mapped, and cycle crossover are options. The one-point crossover means that the par
ent individuals exchange a random prefix when creating the child individuals. Two-point
crossover is an exchange of a random substring, and uniform crossover takes each bit in
the child arbitrarily from either parent. Order and partially mapped crossover are similar
to two-point crossover in that two cut points are selected. For order crossover, the section
between the first and second cut points is copied from the first parent to the child [28]. The
remaining places are filled using elements not occurring in this section, in the order that
they occur in the second parent starting from the second cut point and wrapping around as
needed. For partially mapped crossover, the section between the two cut points defines a
series of swapping operations to be performed on the second parent [28]. Cycle crossover
satisfies two conditions every position of the child must retain a value found in the cor
responding position of a parent, and the child must be a valid permutation. Each cycle, a
random parent is selected. For example [28]:
Parent 1 is (h k c e f d b 1 a i g j) and parent 2is(abcdefghijkl)
For position #1 in the child,
'h' is selected
Therefore,
'a'
cannot be selected from parent 2 and must be chosen from parent 1
Since 'a' is above 'i' in parent 2, T must also be selected from parent 1
So, if
'h' is selected from parent 1 for position #1, then 'a', 'i\ 'j', and T must also
be selected from parent 1
The positions of these elements are said to form a cycle, since selection continues
until the first element ('h' here) is reached again
After crossover, each individual has a small chance of mutation. The purpose of the
mutation operator is to simulate the effect of transcription errors that can happen with a
very low probability when a chromosome is mutated [29]. A standard mutation operator
for binary strings is bit inversion. Each bit in an individual has a small chance of mutating
into its complement i.e. a
'0'
would mutate into a T.
In principle, the loop of selection-crossover-mutation is infinite [29]. However, it is
usually stopped when a given termination condition is met. Some common termination
conditions are [29]:
1 . A pre-determined number of generations have passed
2. A satisfactory solution has been found
3. No improvement in solution quality has taken place for a certain number of genera
tions
The different termination conditions are possible since a genetic algorithm is not guar
anteed to converge to a solution. The evolutionary cycle can be summarized as follows
[29]:
generation = 0
seed population
while not (termination condition) do
generation = generation + 1
calculate fitness
selection
crossover
mutation
end while
Typical application areas for genetic algorithms include:
Function Optimization
Graph Applications such as
- Coloring
- Paths
- Circuit Layout
Scheduling
Satisfiability
Game Strategies
Chess Problems
Computing Models
Neural Networks
Lens Design
Many of these application areas are concerned with problems which are hard to solve
but have easily verifiable solutions. Another trait common to these application areas is
the equation style of fitness function. Cryptography and cryptanalysis could be considered
to meet these criteria. However, cryptanalysis is not closely related to the typical GA
application areas and, subsequently, fitness equations are difficult to generate. This makes
the use of a genetic algorithm approach to cryptanalysis rather unusual.
Chapter 3
Cryptography
In general, the genetic algorithm approach has only been used to attack fairly simple ci
phers. Most of the ciphers attacked are considered to be classical, i.e. those created before
1950 A.D. [21] which have become well known over time. Ciphers attacked include:
Monoalphabetic Substitution cipher
Polyalphabetic Substitution cipher
Permutation cipher
Transposition cipher
Merkle-Hellman Knapsack cipher
Chor-Rivest Knapsack cipher
Vernam cipher
3.1 Monoalphabetic Substitution cipher
The simplest cipher of those attacked is the monoalphabetic substitution cipher. This cipher
is described as follows:
Let the plaintext and the ciphertext character sets be the same, say the alphabet Z
Let the keys, /C, consist of all possible permutations of the symbols in Z
For each permutation it G /C,
1. define the encryption function e7I(x) = n(x)
2. and define the decryption function dn(y) = Tt~l(y), where 7r_1 is the inverse
permutation to n.
For example, define Z to be the 26 letter English alphabet. Then, a random permutation
7r could be (plaintext characters are in lower case and ciphertext characters in upper case)
[27]:
a b c d e f g h i j k 1 m
X N Y A H P 0 G Z Q W B T
n o P q r s t u V w X y z
S F L R C V M U E K J D I
This defines the encryption function like so - en(a) = X, e^(b) = N, etc. The decryp
tion function, dn(y) is the inverse permutation, and can be obtained by switching the rows.
7T"1 is, therefore:
A B C D E F G H I J K L M
d 1 r y v 0 h e z X w P t
N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
b g f j q n m u s k a c i
Using the encryption function, a plaintext of
'plain' becomes a ciphertext of 'LBXZS'.
A ciphertext of 'YZLGHC would decrypt to 'cipher'.
Monoalphabetic substitution is easy to recognize, since the frequency distribution of
the character set is unchanged [21]. The frequency of individual characters changes, of
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course. This attribute allows associations between ciphertext and plaintext characters, i.e.
if the most frequent plaintext character X occurred ten times, the ciphertext character X
maps to will appear ten times.
3.2 Polyalphabetic Substitution cipher
This cipher is a more complex version of the substitution cipher. Instead of mapping the
plaintext alphabet onto ciphertext characters, different substitution mappings are used on
different portions of the plaintext [21]. The result is called polyalphabetic substitution. The
simplest case consists of using different alphabets sequentially and repeatedly, so that the
position of each plaintext character determines which mapping is applied to it. Under dif
ferent alphabets, the same plaintext character is encrypted to different ciphertext characters,
making frequency analysis harder.
This cipher has the following properties (assuming m mappings):
The key space /C consists of all ordered sets ofm permutations
These permutations are represented as (ki, k2, . , km)
Each permutation ki is defined on the alphabet in use
Encryption of the message x = (x1,x2, . . . , xm) is given by
ek(x) = ki(xi)k2(x2) . . . km(xm), assuming the key k = (fci, k2, . . . , km)
The decryption key associated with ek(x) is dk(y) = (k^1, k2l , . . . , fc"1).
The encryption and decryption functions could also be written as follows (assuming
that the addition/subtraction operations occur modulo the size of the alphabet):
eK(x1,x2, .,xm) = (xi + ki,x2 + k2,...,xm + km)
dK(yi,yo.,...,ym) = (y\ - h,y2- k2, . . . ,ym - km)
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The most common polyalphabetic substitution cipher is the Vigenere cipher. This ci
pher encrypts m characters at a time, making each plaintext character equivalent to m
alphabetic characters. A example of the Vigenere cipher is:
Suppose m = 6
Using the mapping A <-> 0, B <-^- 1, . . . , Z <-> 25
If the keyword AC = CIPHER, numerically (2, 8, 15, 7, 4, 17)
Suppose the plaintext is the string
'cryptosystem'
Convert the plaintext elements to residues modulo 26 - 2 17 24 15 19 14 18 24 18 19
4 12
Write the plaintext elements in groups of 6 and add the keyword modulo 26
2 17 24 15 19 14 18 24 18 19 4 12
2 8 15 7 4 17 2 8 15 7 4 17
4 25 13 22 23 5 20 6 7 0 8 3
The alphabetic equivalent of the ciphertext string is: EZNWXFUGHAID.
To decrypt, the same keyword is used but is subtracted modulo 26 from the ciphertext
3.3 Permutation/Transposition ciphers
Although simple transposition ciphers change the dependencies between consecutive char
acters, they are fairly easily recognized since the frequency distribution of the characters
is preserved [21]. This is true for both ciphers considered, the permutation cipher and the
columnar transposition cipher. Both ciphers apply the same principles, but differ in how
the transformation is applied. The permutation cipher is applied to blocks of characters
while the columnar transposition cipher is applied to the entire text at once.
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3.3.1 Permutation cipher
The idea behind a permutation cipher is to keep the plaintext characters unchanged, but
alter their positions by rearrangement using a permutation [27].
This cipher is defined as:
Let m be a positive integer, and AC consist of all permutations of {1, ... , m}
For a key (permutation) -n E AC, define:
The encryption function e7r(xi, . . . ,xm) = (x^i), . . , x^m))
The decryption function d^(yi ym) = (2/^-1(1), ,y*-Hm))
A small example, assuming m = 6, and the key is the permutation n:
ic(l) 2
The first row is the value of i, and the second row is the corresponding value of
7r(z). The inverse permutation, ir~x is constructed by interchanging the two rows, and
rearranging the columns so that the first row is in increasing order, Therefore, 7r_1 is:
X 1 2 3 4 5 6
TX~l(x) 3 6 1 5 2 4
If the plaintext given is 'apermutation', it is first partitioned into groups of m letters
('apermu'
and 'tation') and then rearranged according to the permutation ir. This yields
'EMAURP'
and 'TOTNIA', making the ciphertext equal
'EMAURPTOTNIA'
. The cipher-
text is decrypted in a similar process, using the inverse permutation 7r_1.
3.3.2 Transposition cipher
Another type of cipher in this category is the columnar transposition cipher. As described in
[24], this cipher consists ofwriting the plaintext into a rectangle with a prearranged number
of columns and transcribing it vertically by columns to yield the ciphertext. The key is
a prearranged sequence of numbers which determines both the width of the inscription
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rectangle and the order in which to transcribe the columns [24]. This key is usually derived
from an agreed keyword by assigning numbers to the individual letters according to their
alphabetical order.
For example, if the keyword is SORCERY, the resulting numerical key would be 6 3
4 12 5 7 [24], where numbers are assigned to the keyword letters according to the alpha
betical order of the letters. If we wish to encipher the message LASER BEAMS CAN BE
MODULATED TO CARRY MORE INTELLIGENCE THAN RADIO WAVES, it would
first be written out on a width of 7 under the numerical key. As is traditional, white spaces
and punctuation are ignored in this and all ciphertexts used. The rectangle would look like
this:
S O R C E R Y
6 3 4 12 5 7
L A S E R B E
A M S C A N B
E M O D U L A
T E D T O C A
R R Y M O R E
I N T E L L I
G E N C E T H
A N R A D I O
WAVE S Q R
Since the message length was not a multiple of the keyword length, the message does
not fill the entire rectangle. Deciphering is simplified if the last row contains no blank
cells, so two dummy letters are added (here, Q and R) to make the rectangle completely
filled [24]. Enciphering consists of reading the ciphertext out vertically in the order of the
numbered columns. It can be written in groups of five letters at the same time, if so desired
[24]. The ciphertext is, therefore, ECDTM ECAER AUOOL EDSAM MERNE NASSO
DYTNR VBNLC RLTIQ LAETR IGAWE BAAEI HOR.
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The decipherer would count the number of letters in the message (63) and determine
the length of the inscription rectangle by dividing this value by the length of the keyword.
This makes the inscription rectangle 7 x 9 in this case. The numerical key is then written
above the rectangle and the ciphertext characters entered into the diagram in the order of
the key numbers [24]. The plaintext is read off by rows, as it was originally entered.
3.4 Knapsack ciphers
Knapsack public-key encryption systems are based on the subset sum problem, an NP-
complete problem. Given in this problem are a finite set S C N+ (N+ is the set of natural
numbers {1, 2, . . . }), and a target t G N+. The question is whether there exists a subset
S' C S whose elements sum to t [9]. For example:
If 5 = {1,2,7, 14, 49, 98, 343, 686, 2409, 2793, 16808, 17206, 117705, 117993}
And t = 138457
Then the subset S' = {1, 2, 7, 98, 343, 686, 2409, 17206, 117705} is a solution.
The basic idea of a knapsack cipher is to select an instance of the subset sum problem
that is easy to solve, and then disguise it as an instance of the general subset sum problem
which is hopefully difficult to solve [21]. The original (easy) knapsack set can serve as the
private key, while the transformed knapsack set serves as the public key.
The Merkle-Hellman knapsack cipher is important as it was the first implementation
of a public-key encryption scheme. Many variations on it have been suggested but most,
including the original, have been demonstrated to be insecure [21]. A notable exception to
this is the Chor-Rivest knapsack system [21].
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3.4.1 Merkle-Hellman Knapsack cipher
The Merkle-Hellman knapsack cipher attempts to disguise an easily solved instance of the
subset sum problem, called a superincreasing subset sub problem, by modular multiplica
tion and a permutation [21]. A superincreasing sequence is a sequence (bi,b2, . . . , bn) of
positive integers with the property that 6j > 2^7=1 fy> fr eacn i,2 <i <n.
The integer n is a common system parameter. 6j, b2, . . . , bn is the superincreasing se
quence and M is the modulus, selected such that M > 6] + b2 + . . . + bn. W is a random
integer, such that 1 < W < M 1 and gcd(H/, 7\/) = 1. 7r is a random permutation
of the integers {1,2,..., n}. The public key of A is (ai,a2, . . . , an), where a; = Wbv^
mod M, and the private key ofA is (n, M, W, (h, b2, . . . , bn)).
The steps in the transmission of a message m are as follows (B is the sender, A is the
receiver) [21]:
1 . Encryption - B should do the following:
Obtain A's authentic public key (a1; a2, . . . , an)
Represent the message m as a binary string of length n,
m = m\m2 . . .mn
Compute the integer c = m\a\ + m2a2 + . . . + mnan
Send the ciphertext c to A
2. Decryption To recover the plaintext m from c, A should do the following:
Compute d = W~lc mod M
By solving a superincreasing subset sum problem, find the integers r-\ , r2, . . . , rn,
Ti G {0, 1} such that d = r-\b\ + r2b2 + . . . + rnbn.
The message bits are m, = r^), i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
A small example is as follows [21]:
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1 . Let n = 6
2. Entity A chooses the superincreasing sequence (12, 17, 33, 74, 157, 316)
3. M = 737
4. VU = 635
5. The permutation n of {1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6} is defined as:
6. 7r(l) = 3,7r(2) = 6,tt(3) = 1,tt(4) = 2,tt(5) =5,tt(6) =4
7. A's public key is the knapsack set (319, 196, 250, 477, 200, 559)
8. A's private key is (n, M, W, (12, 17, 33, 74, 157, 316))
9. To encrypt the message m 101101, B computes c as:
10. c = 319 + 250 + 477 + 559 = 1605
1 1 . and sends it to A
1 . To decrypt, A computes
2. d = W~lc mod M = 136
3. and solves the superincreasing subset sum problem of:
4. 136 = 12r: + 17r2 + 33r3 + 74r4 + 157r5 + 316r6
5. to get 136 = 12 + 17 + 33 + 74
6. Therefore, rx = 1, r2 = 1, r3 = 1, r4 = 1, r5 = 0, r6 = 0
7. Applying the permutation n produces the message bits:
8. m1 = r3 = l,ra2 = r6 = 0,m3 = r1 = 1, mA = r2 = l,m5 = r5 = 0,m6 = r4 = 1
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3.4.2 Chor-Rivest Knapsack cipher
The Chor-Rivest cipher is the only known knapsack public-key system that does not use
some form of modular multiplication to disguise an easy subset sum problem [21]. This
cipher is by far the most sophisticated of those attacked by a genetic algorithm. When the
parameters of this system are carefully chosen, and no information is leaked, there is no
feasible attack on the Chor-Rivest system. It can not be covered in detail in a few pages,
so only a summary of the system will be given. Further number theoretical algorithms are
needed for the set-up and operation of the cipher.
Most of the parameters are based on a finite field q, of characteristic p, where q =
ph,p > h and for which the discrete logarithm problem is feasible [21]. f(x) is a random
monic irreducible polynomial of degree h over Zp. The elements ofq are represented as
polynomials in Zp[x] of degree less than h, with multiplication done modulo f(x). g(x)
is a random primitive element of q. For each ground field element i G Zp, the discrete
logarithm ai = log^^x + i) of the field element (x + i) to the base g(x) must be found.
The random permutation n is on the set of integers {0, 1, 2, . . . ,p 1}, and the random
integer d is selected such that 0 < d < ph 2. c, is then computed as c* = (a^j) + d)
mod
(ph 1), 0 < i < p 1. A's public key is ((c0, Ci, . . . ,cp-i),p, h) and its private key
is (f(x),g(x),n,d).
A message m is transmitted as follows (B is the sender, A is the receiver) [21]:
1 . Encryption - B should do the following:
Obtain A's authentic public key ((c0, c\, . . . , cp_i),p, h)
Represent the message m as a binary string of length |lg (^)J, where () is a
binomial coefficient
Considerm as the binary representation of an integer
Transform this integer into a binary vectorM = (M0, Mi, ... , Mp_i) of length
p having exactly h l's as follows:
(a) Set I y- h
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(b) For % from 1 to p do the following:
(c) Ifm > (p;') then set M^ *-l,m*-m- {p~li), I <- I - 1
(d) Otherwise, set A/,_i < 0
(e) Note: () = 1 for n > 0, (?) = 0) for I > 1
Compute c = 2_X^> ^c mo<^
(Ph
~ 1)
Send the ciphertext c to A
2. Decryption To recover the plaintext m from c, A should do the following:
Compute r = (c- hd) mod (ph 1)
Compute u(x) =
g(x)r
mod f(x)
Compute s(x) ~ u(x) + f(x), a monic polynomial of degree h over Zp (Zp is
the set of integers {0, ... ,p 1}. Addition, subtraction, and multiplication in
Zp are performed modulo p.)
Factor s(x) into linear factors over Zp : s(x) = Ylj=1(x + tf), where tj G Zp
Compute a binary vector M = (M0, Ml5 . . . , Mp_i) as follows:
(a) The components ofM that are 1 have indices 7r_1(tj), 1 < j < h.
(b) The remaining components are 0.
The message m is recovered from M as follows:
(a) Set m <- 0, / <- h
(b) For i from 1 to p do the following:
(c) ifMj_x = 1, then set m <- m + (P7') and I < / - 1
An example using artificially small parameters would go as follows [21]:
1 . Entity A selects p = 7 and h = 4
2. Entity A selects the irreducible polynomial /(x) = x4 + 3x3 + 5x2 + 6x + 2 of
degree 4 over Zr. The elements of the finite field 7i are represented as polynomials
in Z7[x] of degree less than 4, with multiplication performed modulo f(x).
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3. Entity A selects the random primitive element g(x) = 3x3 +
3x2 + 6
4. Entity A computes the following discrete logarithms:
. o.o = logg(:r)(x) = 1028
a2 = logg{x)(:r + 1) = 1935
. a2 = logs(l)(./; + 2) = 2054
. a3 = log9(l)(r + 3) = 1008
a., = log5(l)(x + 4) = 379
a5 = logs(l)(.T + 5) = 1780
. a6 = log3(l)(.r + 6) = 223
5. Entity A selects the random permutation n on {0, 1,2,3,4,5,6} defined by 7r(0) =
6,tt(1) = 4,tt(2) = 0,tt(3) = 2,tt(4) = 1,tt(5) = 5,tt(6) = 3
6. Entity A selects the random integer d = 1702
7. Entity A computes:
Co = (a6 + d) mod 2400 = 1925
a = (a4 + d) mod 2400 = 2081
C2 = (o0 + d) mod 2400 = 330
c3 = (a2 + d) mod 2400 = 1356
c4 = (ai + d) mod 2400 = 1237
c5 = (a5 + d) mod 2400 = 1082
c6 = (a3 + d) mod 2400 = 310
8. Entity A's public key is ((c0, Ci, c2, c3, r4, c5, c6),p = 7,h = 4), and its private key is
(/(x),<7(x),7T,d).
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9. To encrypt a message m = 22 for A, entity B does the following:
(a) Obtains A's authentic public key ((c0, Ci, c2, c3,c4,c5, c$),p, h)
(b) Represents m as a binary string of length 5: m = 10110 (Note that [lg Qj =
5).
(c) Transforms m to the binary vector M = (1, 0, 1, 1,0, 0, 1) of length 7
(d) Computes c = (c0 + c2 + c3 + c6) mod 2400 = 1521
(e) Sends c = 1521 to A
10. To decrypt the ciphertext c = 1521, A does the following:
(a) Computes r = (c - hd) mod 2400 =1913
(b) Computes u(x) = #(x)(1913) mod /(.r) = x3 + 3x2 + 2x + 5
(c) Computes s(x) = u(x) + f(x) = x4 + 4x3 + x2 + x
(d) Factors s(x) = x(x + 2)(x + 3)(x + 6) (so *, =0,t2 = 2,*3 = 3,t4 = 6).
(e) The components of 7\/that are 1 have indices 7r_1(0) = 2,7r-1(2) = 3,7r_I(3) =
6, ir-1 (6) = 0. Hence, M= (1,0,1,1,0,0,1)
(f) Transforms M to the integer m = 22, recovering the plaintext
To illustrate how small the above parameters are, the parameters originally suggested
for the Chor-Rivest system are [21]:
p = 197 and h = 24
p = 211 and h = 24
p =
35
and h = 24
p =
28
and h = 25
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3.5 Vernam cipher
The Vernam cipher is a stream cipher defined on the alphabet A = {0, 1}. A binary
message niim2 . . . mt is operated on by a binary key string kjk2 . kt, of the same length
to produce a ciphertext string cxc2 . . . ct where c, = m, (b k,, 1 < i < t [21]. If the key
string is randomly chosen and never used again, this cipher is called a one-time system or
one-time pad.
The one-time pad can be shown to be theoretically unbreakable [21]. If a cryptanalyst
has a ciphertext string c\c2...ct encrypted using a random, non-reused key string, the
cryptanalyst can do no better than guess at the plaintext being any binary string of length t.
It has been proven that an unbreakable Vernam system requires a random key of the same
length as the message [21].
3.6 Comments
The above ciphers comprise all those cryptosystems attacked using a genetic algorithm in
a fairly exhaustive search of the literature. The newest of these systems are the knapsack
ciphers, with the Chor-Rivest system published in 1985, and the Merkle-Hellman system
published in 1978 [21]. The other ciphers attacked are all systems older than that. In some
cases, centuries older. None of the modem ciphers, such as DES, AES, RSA, or Elliptic
Curve, were even attempted using a genetic algorithm based approach. The only ciphers
that are considered even remotely mathematically difficult are the knapsack systems, and
even they are not true number theoretical protocols. This lack makes many of the genetic
algorithm attacks have little importance in the field of cryptanalysis.
22
Chapter 4
Relevant Prior Works
While there have been many papers written on genetic algorithms and their application to
various problems, there are relatively few papers that apply genetic algorithms to cryptanal
ysis. The earliest papers that use a genetic algorithm approach for a cryptanalysis problem
were written in 1993, almost twenty years after the primary paper on genetic algorithms by
John Holland [12] [14]. These papers focus on the simplest classical and modem ciphers,
and are cited frequently by later works.
Figures 4.1 through 4.4 show which ciphers are attacked by which authors.
Substitution
Monoalphabetic Polyalphabetic
/ V
Spillman et. al.1993
Clark 1994
Clark et. al. 1996
Clark & Dawson 1997
C
Clark & Dawson
rundlingh & Van Vu
1998
uren 2002
Figure 4.1: Substitution Cipher Family and Attacking Papers
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Permutation/Transposition
Permutation Transposition
1 \
Clark 1994 Matthews 1 993
Grundlingh & Van Vuuren 2002
Figure 4.2: Permutation Cipher Family and Attacking Papers
Knapsack
Merkle-Hellman
Spillman 1993
Clark, Dawson, Bergen 1996
Kolodziejczuk 1 997
Chor-Rivest
Yaseen, Sahasrabuddhe 1999
Figure 4.3: Knapsack Cipher Family and Attacking Papers
Vernam
Lin, Kao1995
Figure 4.4: Vernam Cipher Family and Attacking Paper
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4.1 Substitution: Spillman et al. - 1993
The first paper published in 1993 by Spillman, Janssen, Nelson and Kepner [26], focuses
on the cryptanalysis of a simple substitution cipher using a genetic algorithm. This paper
selects a genetic algorithm approach so that a directed random search of the key space
can occur. The paper begins with a review of genetic algorithms, covering the genetic
algorithm life cycle, and the systems needed to apply a genetic algorithm. The systems
are considered to be a key representation, a mating scheme, and a mutation scheme. The
selected systems are then discussed. The key representation is an ordered list of alphabet
characters, where the first character in the list is the plaintext character for the most frequent
ciphertext character, the second character is the plaintext character for the second most
frequent ciphertext character, and so on. The mating scheme randomly selects two keys for
mating, weighted in favor of keys with a high fitness value. The two parent keys create two
child keys by selecting from each slot in the parents the more frequent ciphertext character.
The first child key is created by scanning left to right, and the second by scanning right to
left. If the more frequent character is already in the child, then the character from the other
parent is selected. The mutation scheme consists of swapping two characters in the key
string. The fitness function uses unigrams and digrams, and is as follows:
26 26
Fitness = (1 - J]{|5F[i] - DF[i\\ + Y^\SDF[i,j] - DDF[i, j]|}/4)8 (4.1.1)
i=i i=i
The function represents a normalized error value. Larger fitness values represent smaller
errors. Sensitivity to small differences is increased by raising the result to the 8th power,
while sensitivity to large differences is decreased by the division of the summation terms
by 4. SF[i] is the standard frequency of character i in English plaintext, while DF[i] is
the measured frequency of the decoded character i in the ciphertext. This makes the first
summation term equal to the sum of the differences between each character's standard fre
quency and the frequency of the ciphertext character that decodes to that character. SDF
is the standard frequency for a digram and DDF the measured frequency. When the mea
sured and standard frequencies are the same, the summation terms equal zero, making the
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fitness value equal one. This fitness function is bounded below by zero, but cannot evaluate
to zero. Since high fitness values are more important, this does not effect the overall result.
The complete algorithm used in this work is:
1 . Generate a random population of key strings
2. Determine a fitness value for each key in the population
3. Do a biased random selection of parents
4. Apply the crossover operation to the parents
5. Apply the mutation process to the children
6. Scan the new population of key strings and update the list of the 10
"best" keys seen
The process stops after a fixed number of generations, at which point, the best keys are
used to decipher the ciphertext. Results are given for 100 generation runs of the algorithm,
using populations of 10 and 50 keys, and mutation rates of 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, and 0.40. In
the smaller population size, the exact key is found after searching less than 4x10 23 of
the key space, or after the examination of about 1000 keys. In the larger population size,
only about 20 generations are needed to examine 1000 keys. The best mutation rates for
this experiment were those less than 0.20.
4.1.1 Comments
Overall, this paper is a good choice for re-implementation and comparison. It is an early
work, so does not compare its results to others, but provides a decent level of result report
ing and discussion, making comparison possible. It presents the basic genetic algorithm
concepts clearly, and uses examples and diagrams to clarify important points.
Typical results:
- The exact key is not always found
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- Visual inspection of the plaintext is required most of the time to determine the
exact key
Re-implementation approach:
- The same parameters are re-used
- Additional parameters are used to expand the range of parameter values
Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- None - no exact keys found in testing
Comment on result discrepancy:
- Different measures of success were used
4.2 Transposition: Matthews - 1993
The second paper published in 1993 [20], by R. A. J. Matthews, uses an order-based ge
netic algorithm to attack a simple transposition cipher. The paper begins by discussing the
archetypal genetic algorithm. This includes the typical genetic algorithm components, as
well as the two characteristics a problem must have in order for it to be attackable by a
genetic algorithm. The first characteristic is that a partially-correct chromosome must have
a higher fitness than an incorrect chromosome. The second characteristic is an encoding for
the problem that allows genetic operators to work. The next section of the paper discusses
the cryptanalytic use of the genetic algorithm. It concludes that substitution, transposition,
permutation, and other ciphers are attackable by a genetic algorithm, while ciphers such as
DES (Data Encryption Standard), which is a Feistel cipher, are not attackable.
The cipher selected for attack in this work is a classical two-stage transposition cipher.
Here, a key of length N takes the form of a permutation of the integers 1 to N. The
plaintext, L characters long, is written beneath the key to form a matrix TV characters wide
by (at least) L mod N characters deep. The second stage consists of reading the text off
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the columns in the order indicated by the integers in the key. Decryption consists ofwriting
down the key, determining the length of the columns, writing the ciphertext back into the
matrix in sequence, and reading across the columns. Breaking this cipher is typically a two-
stage process as well. The stages are determining the length of the transposition sequence
(TV), and then finding the permutation of the TV integers.
The genetic algorithm system used to attack the transposition cipher is known as GEN-
ALYST. It incorporates all the standard genetic algorithm features, with the addition of the
items needed for an order-based approach. The GENALYST system uses a fitness scoring
system based on the number of times common English digrams and trigrams appear in the
decrypted text. Ten digram and trigrams were used - TH, HE, IN, ER, AN, ED, THE, ING,
AND, and EEE. The presence of EEE resulted in a subtraction of fitness points, as it prac
tically never appears in English. This process was checked for correlation between fitness
value and correctness of chromosome, to improve confidence in GENALYST. GENALYST
selects the fittest chromosomes using a roulette wheel approach based on normalized fitness
values. This means that the probability of a chromosome getting selected is proportional
to its normalized fitness value. "Elitism" is present to ensure that the fittest or most elite
chromosomes found so far are always included in the breeding pool. After selection occurs,
breeding is done with a proportion of the remaining chromosomes. The proportion used
decreases linearly as the search continues, in order to help optimize the effectiveness of
GENALYST. Breeding is done using the position based crossover method for order-based
genetic algorithms. In this method, a random bit string of the same length as the chromo
somes is used. The random bit string indicates which elements to take from parent #1 by a
1 in the string, and the elements omitted from parent #1 are added in the order they appear
in parent #2. The second child is produced by taking elements from parent #2 indicated by
a 0 in the string, and filling in from parent #1 as before. Two possible mutation types may
then be applied. The first type is a simple two-point mutation where two random chromo
some elements are swapped. The second type is a shuffle mutation, where the permutation
is shifted forward by a random number of places.
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A test procedure is given to ensure that test texts have a true fitness value that is repre
sentative of English text. This is calculated mathematically, based on digram/trigram per
centage frequency in the text, the fitness score given by GENALYST to that di- or tri-gram,
and the summation over all di- and tri-grams checked. The text length is also important, as
it is easier to attack texts with a length that is an integer multiple of the key length. Based
on these considerations, a test text with a length of 181 characters was selected. This length
is prime, but close to multiples of 6, 9, 10, and 12. This is a worst-case scenario since not
all column lengths are the same, and multiple possibilities for the key length are present.
A Monte Carlo search is run on the same text so that the genetic algorithm results can be
compared to the results from a traditional search technique. In a Monte Carlo search, a
series of guesses is made to determine the correct key, and the most elite chromosome is
kept.
The breaking of a transposition cipher has two parts: finding the correct keylength, and
finding the correct permutation of the key. GENALYST was tested on both parts. For the
first part, the test text was encrypted using a target key. GENALYST was then used to
find the best decryption of the text, using seven different keylengths in the range of 6 to
12, which includes the length of the target key. The goal of this section was to see if the
fittest of the seven chromosomes had the same length as the target key. The population size
used was 20, and the number of generations was 25. The probability of crossover started
at 0.8 and decreased to 0.5. Mutation probability started at 0.1 for both point mutation and
shuffle mutation, increasing to 0.5 for point mutation and to 0.8 for shuffle mutation. The
experiment was run five times each for three target keylengths, K = 7, 9, 11. GENALYST
was successful in 13 of the 15 runs (87%). However, the random Monte Carlo algorithm
performed equally well in this task, also producing a success rate of 87%. For the second
part, the same parameters of population size and number of generations were used. GEN
ALYST managed to completely break the cipher in one of the runs for K = 7 and one of
the runs for K = 9. Overall, GENALYST involves little more computational effort than
the Monte Carlo algorithm, since the single largest task, fitness rating, is present in both.
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Therefore, a genetic algorithm approach is useful even when only a small advantage is
produced. Using a larger gene pool and number of generations boosts GENALYST's per
formance significantly over the performance ofMonte Carlo. The greatest improvement in
GENALYST's performance comes from hybridizing the algorithm with other techniques,
such as perming.
4.2.1 Comments
Overall, this is one of the best reference papers available. It is an early work, but is very
complete. It covers background material and problem considerations well, and has a very
balanced approach to considering the genetic algorithm as a possible solution. The param
eters are clearly reported, as are the algorithms used. This is an excellent candidate for
re-implementation and comparison.
Typical results:
- Keylength correctly determined 87% of the time
- Correct key found 13.33% of the time
Re-implementation approach:
- Different text lengths used, same parameters re-used
- Additional parameters are used to expand the range of parameter values
Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- Low - low decryption percentage
Comment on result discrepancy:
- Percentages reported are based on number of tests and different numbers of
tests were used
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4.3 Merkle-Hellman Knapsack: Spillman - 1993
The third paper published in 1993, by R. Spillman [25], applies a genetic algorithm ap
proach to a Merkle-Hellman knapsack system. This paper considers the genetic algorithm
as simply another possibility for the cryptanalysis of knapsack ciphers. A knapsack cipher
is based on the NP-complete problem of knapsack packing, which is an application of the
subset sum problem. The problem statement is: "Given n objects each with a known vol
ume and a knapsack of fixed volume, is there a subset of the n objects which exactly fills
the knapsack ?". The idea behind the knapsack cipher is that finding the sum is hard, and
this fact can be used to protect an encoding of information. There must also be a decod
ing algorithm that is relatively easy for the intended recipient to apply. An easy decoding
algorithm can be made by using the easy knapsacks. An easy knapsack consists of a se
quence of numbers that is superincreasing, i.e., each number is greater than the sum of the
previous numbers. However, an easy knapsack does not protect the data if the elements of
the knapsack are known. A Merkle-Hellman knapsack system converts an easy knapsack
into a trapdoor knapsack. A trapdoor knapsack is not superincreasing, making it harder
to attack. The Merkle-Hellman procedure to create a trapdoor knapsack sequence A is as
follows:
1 . Given a simple knapsack sequence A' = (a\ , . . . , a'n)
2. Select an integer u > 2a'n
3. Select another integer w such that gcd(u, w) 1
4. Find the inverse of w mod u
5. Construct the trapdoor sequence A = wA'mod u
Once the easy knapsack has been converted into a trapdoor knapsack, both the easy
knapsack and the value of w~l must be known to decode the data. The target sum for the
superincreasing sequence is calculated by multiplying the sum of the trapdoor sequence and
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w_1 together and then reducing it modulo u. This system can become a public-key cipher,
with the trapdoor sequence the public key. The private key would be the superincreasing
sequence and the values of u, w, and w"1.
The next section of the paper introduces genetic algorithms using binary chromosomes.
The applicable processes of selection, mating, and mutation are described. Selection is a
random process which is biased so that the chromosomes with higher fitness values are
more likely to be selected. The mating process is a simple crossover operation, i.e., bits
s + 1 to r of parent #1 are swapped with bits s + 1 to r of parent #2. Mutation consists of
switching a bit in the chromosome to its complement, i.e., a 0 becomes a 1 .
The three systems that need to be defined for a genetic algorithm application are: rep
resentation scheme, mating process, and mutation process. The representation used here
is that of binary chromosomes, which represent the summation terms of the knapsack, i.e.,
a 1 in the chromosome indicates that that term should be included when calculating the
knapsack sum. The evaluation function is determined once a representation scheme has
been selected. Here, the function measures how close a given sum of terms is to the target
sum of the knapsack. Other properties included for this experiment are:
Function range between 0 and 1 , with 1 indicating an exact match
Chromosomes that produce a sum greater than the target should have a lower fitness,
in general, than those that produce a sum less than the target
It should be difficult to produce a high fitness value
The actual evaluation function used depends on the relationship between the target sum
and the chromosome sum. The function is determined as follows:
1 . Calculate the maximum difference that could occur between a chromosome and the
target sum
MaxDiff = m&x(Target, FullSum - Target) (4.3.1)
where FullSum is the sum of all components in the knapsack
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2. Determine the Sum of the current chromosome
3. If Sum < Target then
Fitness = 1 \J\Sum Target\/Target (4.3.2)
4. If Sum > Target then
Fitness = 1 - {/\Sum - Target]/MaxDiff (4.3.3)
As described above, the mating process is simple crossover. The mutation process
consists of three different possibilities. About half the time, bits are randomly mutated as
described above (switched to their complement). Next most likely is the swapping of a
bit with a neighboring bit. The final possibility is a reversal of the bit order between two
points.
A description of the complete algorithm is given, as well as results for one 15-item
knapsack applied to a 5 character text. The characters are encoded as 8 bit ASCII charac
ters. Each of the 5 sums (one per character) was attacked using the genetic algorithm, with
an initial population of 20 random 15-bit binary strings.
4.3.1 Comments
This paper is reasonable for its length (about 10 pages) and year. Aminimal level of experi
mentation is included but the results and parameters are decently reported. The introductory
material and discussion are reasonable, although short. Re-implementation should not be
difficult, and there are sufficient results to make a comparison possible. Overall, this paper
is a reasonable choice for re-implementation and comparison.
Typical results:
- Used 5 ASCII characters, each ofwhich was decrypted
Re-implementation approach:
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- Not re-implemented
Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- None - the knapsack size is trivial
Comment on result discrepancy:
- No comment, not re-implemented
4.4 Substitution/Permutation: Clark - 1994
The only paper published in 1994, by Andrew Clark [4], includes the genetic algorithm as
one of three optimization algorithms applied to cryptanalysis. The other two algorithms are
tabu search and simulated annealing. The first section of the paper describes the two ciphers
used - simple substitution and permutation. Next, suitability assessment is discussed. This
section is where the fitness functions are developed. For the substitution cipher, the fitness
function is
Fk = (a|SF[t] - DF[t\\+P^2J^\SDF[i\[i) - DDF[t\\j]\) (4-4.1)
A denotes the set of characters in the alphabet (A,B,C,...,Z, space). SF[i] is the
relative frequency of character i in English, while DF[i] is the relative frequency of the
decoded character i in the message decrypted using the key k k. SDF[i\[j] is the relative
frequency of the digram ij in English, while DDF[i][j] is the relative frequency of that
digram in the message decrypted using k. Varying a and /? allows one to favor either the
unigram or digram frequencies. For the permutation cipher, the same approach was used
as in [20] - the scoring table for digrams and trigrams.
The next three sections introduce the basic concepts of simulated annealing, genetic
algorithms, and tabu search. The genetic algorithm section is fairly standard, and con
tains much the same material as earlier papers. The section is short and does not give any
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specifics about the algorithm used. The final section in the paper discusses the results. It is
fairly short, and does not give many details.
4.4.1 Comments
Overall, this paper is too short (5 pages) to be useful. It is well written, but lacks details.
The tiny genetic algorithm section and few reported results make it difficult to re-implement
or even to compare against. This paper is not a good candidate for further use.
Typical results:
- Convergence rates and computation time are the only reported results
Re-implementation approach:
- Parameters were not reported
- Standard parameter values used in other re-implementations were used
- Only the permutation attack was re-implemented as a later work from this au
thor was used for the substitution attack
Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- Medium - the correct key was found with a high success rate
Comment on result discrepancy:
- No real discrepancy, different combination of metrics used
4.5 Vernam: Lin, Kao - 1995
This is the only paper published in 1995. By Feng-Tse Lin and Cheng-Yan Kao, [18] is a
ciphertext-only attack on a Vernam cipher. The paper begins by introducing cryptography
and cryptanalysis, including attack and cryptosystem types, as well as the Vernam cipher
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itself. The Vernam cipher is a one-time pad style system. Let M = m\,m2, ... ,mn
denote a plaintext bit stream and K = ky, k2, . . . , kr a key bit stream. The Vernam cipher
generates a ciphertext bit stream C = Ek(M) = cuc2, ,cn, where a = (m{ + ki)
mod p and p is a base. Since this is a one-key (symmetric or private-key) cryptosystem,
the decryption formula has the same key bit stream K, only M Dk(C) = my, m2, . . .,
where m{ = (ct kt) mod p. The proposed approach is to determine K from an intercepted
ciphertext C, and use it to break the cipher.
Since the described cryptosystem is not the Vernam cipher, and there are many errors in
this paper, both in notation and logic, this application needs no further discussion. The ge
netic algorithm approach is rendered invalid by the errors present in the reported approach
and assumptions.
4.5.1 Comments
This paper is of below average quality. It is rather short, and was written for the IEEE
International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. There are some problems
with English grammar, possibly due to translation from the original language. The systems
are adequately described, but are, however incorrect. The cipher given in this paper is not
the Vernam cipher. A re-implementation is impossible due to the many errors present in
this work.
Typical results:
- One run of the genetic algorithm is shown, with parameters
Re-implementation approach:
- Not re-implemented
Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- None - inconsistent notation, leading one to believe that the cipher attacked is
not the true Vernam cipher
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Comment on result discrepancy:
- No comment, not re-implemented
4.6 Merkle-Hellman Knapsack: Clark, Dawson, Bergen -
1996
This paper, by Clark, Dawson, and Bergen [7] is an extension of [25]. It contains a detailed
analysis of the fitness function used in [25], as well as a modified version of the same fitness
function. The paper begins by introducing the subset sum problem and previous work in
genetic algorithm cryptanalysis. The fitness function from [25] is then discussed. Since the
reason this function penalizes solutions which have a sum greater than the target sum for
no clear reason, the function is altered to:
Fitness = 1 - (\Sum - Target] /'MaxDif'/)* (4.6.1)
The altered fitness function is found to be more efficient by running a genetic algorithm
attack on 100 different knapsacks sums from the knapsack of size 15 used by Spillman
[25]. This function requires fewer generations, on average, and searches less of the key
space to find a solution.
The genetic algorithm attack is then introduced and Spillman 's [25] attack summarized.
In this work, for each of three different knapsack sizes 15, 20, and 25, 100 different
knapsack sums were formed, and the algorithm run until the solution was found. The
amount of key space searched is about half that of an exhaustive attack, which is not a
significant gain for a large knapsack. The gain is insignificant due to the overhead of the
genetic algorithm approach. Also, the number of generations required, and the percentage
of the key space searched vary widely between runs.
This attack is poor because the fitness function does not accurately describe the suit
ability of a given solution. The Hamming distance between the proposed solution and
the true solution is not always indicated correctly by the fitness function. A high fitness
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value does not necessarily mean a low Hamming distance. The distribution of Hamming
distances for a given range of fitness values appears to be binomial-like. Therefore, a fit
ness function based on a difference of sums is not adequate when attempting to solve the
subset-sum problem with an optimization algorithm. Experimental results show that the
genetic algorithm gives little improvement over an exhaustive search in terms of solution
space covered, and, in fact, an exhaustive attack will be faster, on average, due to reduced
algorithmic complexity.
4.6.1 Comments
This paper clearly discusses the problems with an earlier work, [25]. It is well written
and gives a reasonable number of details. It is not, however a stand-alone work. A re-
implementation is possible but unnecessary since the work establishes that the fitness func
tion used is inappropriate. A comparison may be possible but unlikely since a new fitness
function for the attack is needed.
Typical results:
- Reports the number of generations and the key space searched
- These results are for three knapsack sizes (15, 20, 25), each attacked until the
solution was found
Re-implementation approach:
- Not re-implemented
Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- None - this work disproves the usefulness of an earlier work [25]
Comment on result discrepancy:
- No comment, not re-implemented
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4.7 Vigenere: Clark, Dawson, Nieuwland - 1996
This paper, by Clark, Dawson, and Nieuwland [8], is the first to use a parallel genetic al
gorithm for cryptanalysis. It attacks a polyalphabetic substitution cipher. The first section
introduces the simple and polyalphabetic substitution ciphers, while the second section in
troduces the genetic algorithm. The parallel approach chosen for this work is to have a
number of serial genetic algorithms working on a separate part of the problem. In this case,
since more than one key must be found, each processor will work on finding a different
key. Next, the application of the parallel genetic algorithm to the polyalphabetic substitu
tion cipher is discussed. The fitness function uses weighted unigram, digram, and trigram
frequencies as follows:
N N
F(K) = Wl (#i[i] - Dy[z})2 + w2 J2(K2[i,j] - D2[t,j})2+
i=i '1.7=1
N
w3 Y, (K3[i,j,k}-D3[i,j,k})2 (4.7.1)
Here, K is a single N character key for a simple substitution cipher. Ky, K2, and K3
are the known unigram, digram, and trigram statistics, respectively. D\, D2, and D3 are
the statistics for the decrypted message, and wy, w2, and w3 are weights chosen to equal
one and emphasize different statistics. Since computation of a fitness function including
trigrams can be computationally intensive, this work starts out using only unigrams and
digrams, and later adds in the trigram statistics.
M processors in parallel are used, where M is the period of the polyalphabetic substi
tution cipher. Each processor works on one of the M keys, and communicates with other
processors after a number of iterations. This communication involves sending the best key
to each of a processor's neighbors, which allows digram and trigram statistics to be com
puted. The mating function is borrowed from [26] and requires the same special ordering
of the key. Mutation has two possibilities, depending on the relative fitness of the child key.
If the child has a fitness greater than the median in the gene pool, each character is swapped
with the character to its right. If the child's fitness is less than the median, each character is
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swapped with a randomly chosen character in the key. The selection mechanism used is to
combine all the children and all the keys from the previous generation together and select
the most fit to be the new generation.
Fixed parameters for the experiment include:
A gene pool size of 40
A period of 3
200 iterations of the genetic algorithm
A mutation rate of 0.05
10 iterations between slave-to-slave communications
The first test was done to determine the amount of known ciphertext needed to retrieve a
significant portion of the plaintext. A plot was created, with each point found by running the
algorithm on ten different encrypted messages, five times per message. In the five runs per
message, the random number generator was seeded differently every time. About 90% of
the original message was recovered using 600 known ciphertext characters per key. In this
test, the weights were yj\ = 0.4, w2 = 0.6, and w3 = 0.0 initially, and u>\ = 0.2, w2 = 0.3,
and w3 0.5 after 100 iterations.
The second test was done to indicate the optimal choice of weights. The weights were
chosen such that
wy,w2, w3 e {0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}
and Yh=i Wi = "^- There are 66 combinations that satisfy these conditions. The algorithm
was mn 20 times per combination on ten different messages, twice per message. Of the two
runs per message, the best result was taken, with the ten best results then averaged together.
The values of wy,w2 and w3 were fixed for all 200 iterations of the algorithm. The best
results occurred when w3 = 0.8.
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4.7.1 Comments
This paper is short but reasonably detailed. The algorithms are clearly defined and the result
graphs are a nice touch. However, only the parallel case is considered, making the paper of
limited usefulness. Re-implementation and comparison are reasonably possible, both in a
serial and a parallel version. If re-implemented, the serial version would be created first to
determine if parallelization is warranted.
Typical results:
- Reports on the amount of known ciphertext required in order to regain a certain
percentage of the original message
- Reports on the optimal choice of fitness function weights
Re-implementation approach:
- Re-implemented in a serial version only
- Most of the original parameters were used in the re-implementation
- Additional parameters are used to expand the range of parameter values
Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- None - no messages were successfully decrypted
Comment on result discrepancy:
- Different conclusions based on the different metrics used
4.8 Vigenere: Clark, Dawson - 1997
This is the first paper published in 1997. By Clark and Dawson, [5] is, overall, a slightly
more detailed, longer version of [8]. Therefore, it shares all the same characteristics and is
evaluated as above.
41
4.9 Merkle-Hellman Knapsack: Kolodziejczyk - 1997
This paper [17], published in 1997, is by Kolodziejczyk. It is an extension of [25]. It
focuses on the Merkle-Hellman knapsack system, and the effect of initial parameters on
the approach reported in [25]. The paper introduces the Merkle-Hellman knapsack, and
then discusses the application of a genetic algorithm to the cryptanalysis thereof. Certain
restrictions are placed on the encoding algorithm. These are:
Only the ASCII code will be used in encryption
The superincreasing sequence will have 8 elements, ensuring that each character has
a unique encoding
The plaintext is not more than 100 characters in length
Due to these restrictions, the knapsack is a completely trivial problem. The genetic
algorithm approach needs no discussion, as this application has no point.
4.9.1 Comments
Overall, this paper presents a reasonable amount of numerical data and is a good extension
work to [25]. Unfortunately, the paper is not well written, has poor English grammar and
word usage, and uses a completely trivial knapsack. The only contribution of this paper is
the addition of parameter variation to [25]. There is no point in reimplementation of this
paper.
Typical results:
- Used 5 ASCII characters, each of which was decrypted
Re-implementation approach:
- Not re-implemented
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Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- None - knapsack size is trivial
Comment on result discrepancy:
- No comment, not re-implemented
4.10 Substitution: Clark, Dawson - 1998
This is the only paper published in 1998. By Clark and Dawson, [6] compares three op
timization algorithms applied to the cryptanalysis of a simple substitution cipher. These
algorithms are simulated annealing, the genetic algorithm, and tabu search. Performance
criteria, such as speed and efficiency, are investigated. The paper begins by introducing
the application area and giving the basis for the current work. A simple substitution cipher
is attacked by all three algorithms, with a new attack for tabu search, as compared to the
attack done in [4]. Each of the attacks are compared on three criteria:
The amount of known ciphertext available to the attack
The number of keys considered before the correct solution was found
The time required by the attack to determine the correct solution
The next section of the paper gives a detailed overview of each of the three algorithms.
It is followed by an overview of the attack, as well as details about the attack for each
algorithm. The overall attack uses a general suitability assessment or fitness function. As
suming A denotes the language alphabet, here {A, . . . , Z, _} (where _ is the symbol for a
space), the function is:
^ =El^)-^)l+^EK,)-Z)L)l + 7 \Klm-Dlhk)\ (4.10.1)
ieA i,jeA i,j,kA
k is the proposed key, K is the known language statistics, D is the decrypted message
statistics, and u/b/t are the unigram, digram, and trigram statistics. a,j3, and 7 are the
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weights. The complexity of this formula is 0(N3), where N is the alphabet size, when
trigram statistics are used. The effectiveness of using the different n-grams is evaluated
using a range of weights, and it is concluded that trigrams are the most effective basis for
a cost function, but the benefit of using trigrams over digrams is small. In fact, due to
the added complexity of using trigrams, it is usually more practical to use only unigrams
and digrams. Therefore, the remainder of the paper uses a fitness function based only on
digrams. This function is:
^=DA(U)-^,)I (4-10-2)
i,jeA
The genetic algorithm attack section begins with detailed pseudocode for the mating
process, which is similar to that used in [26]. Selection is random, with a bias towards
the more fit chromosomes. Next, the mutation operator is discussed. Mutation randomly
swaps two characters in a chromosome. Pseudocode is then given for the overall genetic
algorithm attack. The attack parameters are M, the solution pool size, and MAXJTER,
the maximum number of iterations. The M best solutions after reproduction continue on
to the next iteration.
Experimental results for the three algorithms were generated with 300 runs per data
point. One hundred different messages were created for each case, and the attack mn three
times per message. The best result for each message was then averaged together to produce
the data point. This is done to provide a good representation of the algorithm's ability. In
overall outcome of the attack, all the algorithms performed approximately the same. The
algorithms also perform equally well when comparing the amount of ciphertext provided
in the attack. Considering complexity, however, simulated annealing is more efficient than
the genetic algorithm, and tabu search is the most efficient.
4.10.1 Comments
Overall, this paper is well written and provides a good level of detail. It provides good
discussion of important points, especially in interpretation of the results. It is not focused
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on a genetic algorithm attack, and only uses a simple substitution cipher, however, the
details given make a re-implementation fairly easy, and provide enough information for
comparison purposes. This paper is a good choice for further study.
Typical results:
- Results include number of key elements correct vs. amount of known cipher-
text, number of key elements correct vs. total keys considered and number of
key elements correct vs. time
Re-implementation approach:
- Parameters were not reported
- Standard parameter values used in other re-implementations were used
Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- None - no successful decryptions of the message occurred
Comment on result discrepancy:
- Different conclusions based on the different metrics used
4.11 Chor-Rivest Knapsack: Yaseen, Sahasrabuddhe - 1999
This is the only paper from 1999. By Yaseen and Sahasrabuddhe, [31 ] is also the only paper
that considers a genetic algorithm attack on the Chor-Rivest public key cryptosystem. The
paper begins with a review of the Chor-Rivest scheme, followed by a review of genetic
algorithms. The genetic algorithm attack is then discussed.
The input to the genetic algorithm is A = (ay,..., an), a knapsack of positive integers,
and c, an integer which represents the cipher. The output is M = (m.y , mn), a binary
vector such that c = A M. A and M are both binary vectors. The binary vector A
is the chromosome that represents the solution message M. The length of the vector is
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n, the same as the size of the knapsack. ax = 1 if the element has been chosen and
0 otherwise, the same as in [25]. The initial population is created randomly, such that
each n-bit binary chromosome contains exactly h l's, where h is the degree of the monic
irreducible polynomial f(x) over Zp. The fitness function is:
Determine the value of the current chromosome (call it Sum)
Fit = \- ^\Sum - Target] IFullSum (4.11.1)
where FullSum is the sum of all the components in the knapsack
Two genetic operators are used during the alteration (mutation) phase of the algorithm.
They are:
Swapbits: choose two positions in the chromosome randomly and swap their contents
Invert: choose two positions in the chromosome randomly and reverse the sequence
of bits between them
The parameters used throughout the experiment are:
pinv (the probability of the invert operation occurring) = 0.75
pm (the probability of the swapbits operation occurring) initially = 0.75
Population size of 30
To assist the fitness function, the chromosomes with a Hamming distance of 2 and 4
from a target were the ones used. This approach is based on some observations made in [7].
Experimental results were provided for the knapsacks of the fields GF(135), GF(175), GF(195),
and GF(235). These results are for the average of 30 experiments, both with and without
the Hamming distance technique. With the Hamming technique, as the size of the knapsack
increased, the percentage of search space visited decreased. Without the technique, the per
centage visited had no relation to the knapsack size. With the technique, 1 to 2 % of search
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space was visited, versus 50 to 90 % without. The average number of generations showed
a similar increase - 1 to 10 generations with the technique and 23 to 900 generations with
out, on average. Of the 120 experiments done in each case, 33 experiments without the
technique did not reach a solution even after 5000 generations.
4.11.1 Comments
The main focus of this paper is on the Hamming distance technique, which is not explained
that clearly. A reasonable level of detail is included, however, due to length (5 pages) and
clarity issues, this paper is a poor choice for re-implementation.
Typical results:
- Reports the average number of chromosomes required to find an exact solution
Re-implementation approach:
- Not re-implemented
Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- None - lacks information about parameters required to analyze the attack
Comment on result discrepancy:
- No comment, not re-implemented
4.12 Substitution/Transposition: Grundlingh,VanVuuren
- submitted 2002
This paper has not yet been published, but was submitted for publication in 2002. By
Griindlingh and Van Vuuren, [13] combines operations research with cryptology and at
tacks two classical ciphers with a genetic algorithm approach. The two ciphers studied
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are substitution and transposition. The paper begins with some historical background on
the two fields, and then covers basic components of symmetric (private key) ciphers. The
next two sections discuss genetic algorithms and letter frequencies in natural languages.
The main difficulty in a genetic algorithm implementation is said to be the consideration
of constraints. As for character frequencies, these were generated for 7 languages from
modern bible texts.
The mono-alphabetic substitution cipher was attacked first. In this case, consider a
ciphertext T of length N, formed from a plaintext of the same length in a natural language
L. The fitness function of a candidate key k, is:
Ti{Lm) =^-^-M-^tt)l (4.12.1,
2KN ~ Prnin\L))
Here, pf(L) represents the (scaled) expected number of times the letter i will appear per
N characters in a natural language L text. /, (k) is the observed number of occur
rences of letter i when the ciphertext T, of length N, is decrypted using the key k. Also,
Pmin(L) = mini{p^(L)}. The limits of Ty are [0, 1], and both bounds may be reached in
extreme cases. The rationale behind this fitness function involves discrepancies between
the expected number of occurrences and the observed number of occurrences of a letter i.
An alternative option for the fitness measure, this time including digrams is:
T2(L, N,T,k) = [2(2iV - 1 - plin(L) - S^(L)) - $>f (L) - f?{N\k)\
i=A
~ EK^ - 4(JV)()I] - (2(2iV - l - P^(L) - C(i))) (4-12.2)
ij=A
Here, pf(L) and 5^(L) represent the expected number of occurrences of, respectively,
the letter i and the digram ij, per A^ characters in a natural language L text. f^N\k)
and
fj-" \k) are the observed number of occurrences of, respectively, the letter i and
the digram ij, when the ciphertext T is decrypted using the key k. Also, p^in(L) =
mini{pf(L)} and 5%in(L) = m.inij{8^(L)}. The same limits apply to T2 as to Ty.
A detailed algorithm overview, including pseudocode, is discussed next, including the
genetic operators of mutation, crossover, and selection. The mutation operator is a single
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random swap of two characters. Crossover occurs during a traversal of the parent chromo
somes. The first child chromosome is produced as follows:
Begin a left-to-right traversal of the parent chromosomes
Select character / from the parent whose z-th character has the better frequency match
to the expected number of occurrences of i
If the 2-th character already appears in the child
- Select the character from the other parent
- If the characters are both already in the child, leave the position blank
If any characters do not appear in the child, insert them to minimize discrepancies
between observed and expected frequency counts
The second child is produced by the same process using a right-to-left traversal. Keys
are selected stochastically, such that keys that have a higher fitness value are more likely to
be mated. The algorithm was mn on a ciphertext of 2,5 1 9 characters and a population size
of 20. Using (4. 1 2. 1 ) an average pool fitness of 90 % was reached within 7 generations, and
using (4.12.2), an average of 75 % within 15 generations. The algorithm was run for 200
generations, and sets of the best 3 keys overall were kept as well as the final population.
The transposition cipher was attacked second, using a similar genetic algorithm ap
proach. This attack assumes that the number of columns is known, but the column shuffling
is unknown. The fitness function then becomes (using the same symbols as before):
n
2(N - 1 - 6Zin(L)) - f,_J<$(L) - f^N\k)\
T3(L,N,T,k) =
2(^-1-^,(1))
^ ^
The crossover operator uses a random binary vector to select entries from the parents.
The first child is formed by taking values from parent 1 where 1 occurs in the binary vector.
The rest of the values are filled from parent 2, in the order in which they occur. The second
child is formed starting from parent 2, and using the locations of the O's in the binary
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vector. Two mutation operators are considered - point and shift. A point mutation consists
of randomly selecting two positions in a key and swapping their values. Shift mutation, on
the other hand, consists of shifting the values in a key a random number of positions to the
left or right modulo the length of the key. Otherwise, the same algorithm was used in this
attack as for the simple substitution cipher. No convergence of fitness values was found for
this attack.
The paper concludes by describing a decision tool created to assist cryptanalysts who
routinely attack substitution ciphers. This tool is graphical in nature, and is based on the
genetic algorithm attack on substitution ciphers discussed above.
4.12.1 Comments
Overall, this paper is pretty good and includes good introductory material. It lacks enough
detail in the results section to be easily comparable, but gives a great level of detail for the
functions, algorithms, and operators used. It is a good candidate for re-implementation, but
not for comparison.
Typical results:
- Gives the final population pool and the partially decrypted ciphertext produced
by the best key for the substitution attack
- Transposition attack declared to be nonconvergent and no results given
Re-implementation approach:
- Both the substitution and transposition ciphers were re-implemented
- Different text lengths used, same parameters re-used
- Additional parameters are used to expand the range of parameter values
Observed cryptanalytic usefulness:
- Substitution: None - no messages successfully decrypted
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- Transposition: Low low decryption percentage
Comment on result discrepancy:
- Different conclusions based on the different metrics used
4.13 Overall Comments
The quality of the reference works found in the literature varies widely. This issue is com
pounded by the low number of reference works found - twelve. Several of these works were
too poorly specified for further use or used trivial parameters, leaving even fewer valid ref
erence works. Seven works contained enough information for a re-implementation to be
completed. Some of these works depended on other, earlier works for the re-implementation
to be possible. A common set of metrics for these re-implemented works is gathered. It
is not possible to compare the results using the new metrics to the results reported in the
previous works due to the differences in metric composition. The metrics previously used
are a diverse collection, with very different bases. This diversity is one of the motivating
factors for this work.
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Chapter 5
Traditional Cryptanalysis Methods
Only four of the seven ciphers attacked using a genetic algorithm will be further inves
tigated. These ciphers are monoalphabetic substitution, polyalphabetic substitution (e.g.
the Vigenere cipher), permutation and columnar transposition. The other three ciphers are
excluded due to various reasons.
The Merkle-Hellman knapsack cipher was initially marked for further study but has
been removed due to the difficulty of implementing the seminal attack by Shamir [23].
This attack involves Lenstra's integer programming algorithm and a fast diophantine ap
proximation algorithm. The Chor-Rivest knapsack cipher is difficult to implement and was
only considered for a genetic algorithm attack in one paper, which used trivial examples of
the system. The paper [31] is short and does not explain the attack technique well, making
it difficult to re-implement the work. The third cipher that will not be considered further
is the Vernam cipher. This cipher is one of the few that exhibits perfect secrecy, however,
it is not widely used due to the key length requirements. This cipher is also attacked us
ing a genetic algorithm in only one paper [18] which really is not attacking the cipher it
claims it is. Therefore, due to lack of replicable works, this cipher is excluded from further
investigation.
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5.1 Distinguishing among the three ciphers
If the cipher type is not already known, inspection of the frequency of occurrence of the
ciphertext letters (i.e. how often each ciphertext character appears in the ciphertext), will
distinguish between a permutation and a substitution cipher. Each language (e.g. French,
English, German) has a different set of frequencies for its letters. A permutation cipher
will produce a ciphertext with the same frequency distribution as that of the language of
the plaintext [24]. For example, if the plaintext was written in English, a permutation cipher
will produce ciphertext with the same frequency distribution as any similar English text.
The index of coincidence (IC) measures the variation in letter frequencies in a ciphertext
[22]. If simple (monoalphabetic) substitution has been used, then there will be considerable
variation in the letter frequencies and the IC will be high [22]. As the period of the cipher
increases (i.e. more alphabets are used), the variation in letter frequencies decreases and
the IC is low.
5.2 Monoalphabetic substitution cipher
The traditional attack for the monoalphabetic substitution cipher utilizes frequency analysis
and examination. The first step is to analyze the ciphertext to determine the frequency of
occurrence of each character [27]. The frequencies of digrams and trigrams may also be
determined in this step. Then, based on the frequencies, the cryptanalyst examines the
ciphertext and proceeds by guessing and changing guesses for which cipher character is
which plaintext character.
For example, the most frequent character in an English text is E [27]. Therefore, the
ciphertext character that appears most frequently is highly likely to be the equivalent of
the plaintext E. The next most frequent English letters are T, A, O, I, N, S, H, and R, all
with around the same frequency. Digram and trigram statistics can be used to help identify
these. TH, HE, and IN are the three most common digrams, and the three most common
trigram are THE, ING, and AND. In the end, however, the cryptanalyst must gain a feel for
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the text and proceed by guessing letters until the text becomes legible.
5.3 Polyalphabetic substitution cipher
The polyalphabetic substitution cipher (here, the Vigenere cipher) is attacked using two
techniques - the Kasiski test and the index of coincidence [27]. The first step is to determine
the keyword length, denoted m.
The Kasiski test was described by Friedrich Kasiski in 1863, but apparently discovered
earlier, around 1854, by Charles Babbage [27]. This test is based on the observation that
"two identical segments of plaintext will be encrypted to the same ciphertext whenever their
occurrence in the plaintext is 5 positions apart, where 6 = 0 (mod
m)"[27]. Conversely,
if two segments of ciphertext are identical and have at least a length of three, then there is
a good chance they correspond to identical segments of plaintext [27].
The Kasiski test follows the below procedure [27]:
1 . Search the ciphertext for pairs of identical segments of length at least three
2. Record the distance between the starting positions of the two segments
3. If several such distances are obtained (Sy,82, . . .),
m divides all of the <5j's
and, therefore, m divides the greatest common divisor (gcd) of the <5;'s
The index of coincidence is used to further verify the value of m. This concept was
defined by Wolfe Friedman in 1920, as follows [27]:
Suppose x = X1X2 xn is a string of n alphabetic characters
The index of coincidence of x, denoted Jc(x) is defined to be the probability that two
random elements of x are, identical
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Suppose the frequencies of A, B, C, . . . , Z in x are denoted by /0, fy, , f'2b, respec
tively. Two elements of x can be chosen in I 1 ways [27]. For each i, 0 < i < 25, there
are I l J ways of choosing both elements to be i. This produces the formula [27]:
UX) =
25 / f.\ 25
o E/'(/'-i)
i=0 \z/ i=0
/n\ n(n 1)
k2,
Suppose x is a string of English text. Then, if the expected probabilities of occurrence
of the letters A,B,...,Z are denoted by p0, . . . ,p25, respectively, we would expect that
25
^c(-i') ~ YI Pi = 0-065 [27]. The same reasoning applies if x is a ciphertext string obtained
i=0
using any monoalphabetic cipher - the individual probabilities are permuted but the quantity
YpI 's unchanged.
Now, suppose we have a ciphertext string y = yxy2 -yn produced by a Vigenere
cipher. Define m substrings of y, denoted yi,y2, - - ,ym, by writing out the ciphertext, in
columns, in a rectangular array of dimensions m x (n/m) [27]. The rows of this matrix are
the substrings y;, 1 < i < m. This means that we have:
Yl = ?/l?/m+2/l?/2m+
yi = y2ym+y2y2m+
Ym = ?/m2/2m?/3m * * "
If yi, Y2, , ym are constmcted as shown, and m is indeed the keyword length, then
^c(yi) should be approximately equal to 0.065 for 1 < i < m. If m is not the keyword
length, then the substrings yi will look much more random since they will have been pro
duced by shift encryption with different keys. A completely random string produces an
Ic 26(^)2 = ^ = 0.038 [27]. These two values (0.065 and 0.038) are far enough apart
that the correct keyword length can be obtained or confirmed using the index of coinci
dence.
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After the value of m has been determined, the actual key, K = (ky, k2, , km) needs
to be found. The method in [27] is as follows:
Let 1 < i < m and /0, . . . , /25 denote the frequencies of A, B, . . . , Z in the string y;
Let n' = n/m be the length of the string y-t
f f
The probability distribution of the 26 letters in y; is then , . . . , -
n'
n
Since each substring yi is obtained by shift encryption of a subset of the plain
text elements using a shift kt, it is hoped that the shifted probability distribution
will be close to the ideal probability distribution po, ,P25, with
Jki .125+k,
n n
subscripts evaluated modulo 26
25 ,
Suppose that 0 < g < 25 and define the quantity M =
\^
_Jl
^-^ n'
2=0
25
If g = ki, then Mgw^ = 0.065
i=0
If g 7^ kt, then Mg will usually be significantly smaller than 0.065
This technique should allow the determination of the correct value of kt for each value of
i, 1 < i < m.
5.4 Permutation/Transposition ciphers
The permutation cipher defined in [27] is the same as that used in [4], while [20] and [13]
use a columnar transposition cipher. The permutation cipher will be attacked by exhaustion
as per [22]. This attack consists of considering d\ permutations of the d characters, where
d is the period of the cipher. The ciphertext is divided into blocks of various lengths, and
all possible permutations considered. For each possible value of d, starting at d = 2, all
d\ possible permutations are attempted on the first two groups of d letters. For example, if
d = 2, the first two groups of 2 letters are permuted as (letter 1 )(letter 2) and (letter 2)(letter
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1). This continues until one or both of the groups permute into something that looks like a
valid word or word part. At this time, the possibly valid permutation is applied to the other
groups of letters in the ciphertext. If the permutation produces valid text, i.e., the human
cryptanalyst accepts the text as valid in the language used, then the attack is completed,
otherwise, the process continues.
The columnar transposition cipher is attacked differently for an incompletely filled rect
angle than for a completely filled rectangle. We will assume that the rectangle is completely
filled in order to simplify the attack. The width of a completely filled rectangle must be a
divisor of the length of the message, i.e., if the message has 77 letters, the rectangle must
be either 7 or 1 1 letters wide [24]. The ciphertext is written vertically into rectangles of
the possible widths, and a solution obtained by rearranging the columns to form plain
text. The process of restoring a disarranged set of letters into its original positions is called
anagramming [24].
There are several ways to proceed with the process of anagramming. These include
the use of a probable word, the use of a probable sequence, digram/trigram charts, contact
charts, and vowel frequencies. A contact chart is an extension of the digram/trigram charts,
and contains information relating to the likelihood that a specific letter will be preceded or
followed by another letter. Vowel frequencies are language-specific. In English, vowels
comprise approximately 40% of the text, independent of text length [1 1]. Therefore, when
putting the ciphertext into matrix (rectangle) form, a period should be chosen which pro
duces the most even distribution of vowels across the columns of the matrix [19]. The text
is deciphered more easily if the columns are then exchanged so that the most frequently oc
curring letter combinations appear first [19]. This fact helps the cryptanalyst to determine
the most likely possible width for the inscription rectangle.
The next step after vowel frequency examination is usually the use of a probable word
or sequence. The probable word is used when the cryptanalyst has some information about
the message which would lead to the assumption of a word in the text [24]. For example,
if the message is of a military nature, words such as division, regiment, attack, report,
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communication, enemy, retreat, etc. are likely to be present [11]. If a probable word can
not be assumed, the next option is to look for the presence of one of the less frequent
digrams such as QU or YP [11]. If this is not possible either, reconstruction may default to
working on the first word of the message as in [24].
If there is some difficulty involved in anagramming the first row, the next step is to try to
fit two columns together to produce good digraphs [24]. One technique for column fitting
is to give each assumed digram its frequency in plaintext and then add the frequencies
[15]. The combination with the highest total is most likely to be correct [15]. Next, one
would attempt to extend the digrams into trigrams, and so on. Columns can be added both
before and after the current set, so the extension into trigrams and longer combinations
must consider both situations.
5.5 Comments
Overall, the traditional attack methods are not easily automated, and tend to require a
trained and experienced cryptanalyst. The polyalphabetic substitution cipher is the only
one that is attacked mostly mathematically. Mathematical information is used for both the
monoalphabetic substitution cipher and the permutation/transposition ciphers, however, the
main component of these attacks is the human cryptanalyst. The final decision on whether
or not the plaintext is found is always made by the human cryptanalyst, no matter which
method is used in the attack.
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Chapter 6
Attack Results
6.1 Methodology
The main metric for both classical and genetic algorithm attacks was elapsed time. This
was measured using the tcsh built-in command, "time". In the classical algorithm case,
the elapsed time is measured from the time the attack begins to the time the ciphertext is
completely decrypted. This measurement is almost completely comprised of time spent
interacting with the user, as processing time is less than is measurable with the
"time"
command. In the genetic algorithm case, each attack was run using a tcsh shell script.
Therefore, the amount of time spent in user interaction is minimal, and the elapsed time
measurement is comprised almost wholly of processing time. The differences in composi
tion of elapsed time for the two categories of attack make it difficult to compare the attacks
on a time basis. Therefore, an additional metric is used for the genetic algorithm attacks.
This additional metric, used only for the genetic algorithm attacks, is the percentage
of attacks which completely decrypted the ciphertext, as determined by the human crypt
analyst upon examination of the final result. This metric is invalid in a classical attack,
as this class of attacks mn until the text is decrypted. A genetic algorithm attack, on the
other hand, runs for a specific number of generations, independent of the decryption of the
ciphertext. Using this metric, as well as the elapsed time, gives one a better feel for the
usefulness of each attack. The time measurement is irrelevant if the attack is unsuccessful.
These two metrics were chosen so that traditional and genetic algorithm attacks could
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be compared. Elapsed time measures the efficiency of the attack while the percentage of
successful attacks measures how useful the attack is. Both of these metrics are needed to
gauge the success of an attack.
The same set of ciphertexts was used for all attacks. This set consists of 100, 500,
and 1000 characters of five different English texts. These texts are: Chapter 1 of Genesis
from the King James Version of the Bible [2], Patrick Henry's "Give me liberty or give
me
death!"
speech [3], Section 1/Part 1 of Charles Darwin's The Origin ofSpecies [10],
Chapter 1 of H. G. Wells's The Time Machine [30], and Chapter 1/Part 1 of Louisa May
Alcott's Little Women [1].
Additional parameters were required for the genetic algorithm attacks. The parame
ters were compiled from the various genetic algorithm attacks found in the literature and
then extended to cover greater parameter space. All attacks were mn using the following
parameters:
Population sizes of 10, 20, 40, or 50
Number of generations equaling 25, 50, 100, 200 or 400
Mutation rates of 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.40
Each possible combination of parameters was mn once per ciphertext and length combina
tion.
Certain genetic algorithm attacks required additional parameters. The columnar trans
position attacks were mn using keylengths of 7, 9, or 1 1 . The Vigenere attack was run
using a period of 3, 5, or 7. The fitness weights used in the Vigenere attack were: 0.1 for
unigrams and digrams, 0.8 for trigrams. The permutation attack was run using keylengths
of 2, 4, or 6. The only attack that varied from others attacking its cipher type was the
Matthews [20] columnar transposition attack. An additional set of parameters was used for
this attack. These parameters were:
Initial and Final Crossover probabilities
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Initial and Final Point Mutation probabilities
Initial and Final Shuffle Mutation probabilities
In order to use the same set of parameters as the other attacks, both crossover probabilities
were set to 1 and both of the point mutation and shuffle mutation values were set to 0.05,
0.10, 0.20 or 0.40. The additional set of parameters used consisted of setting the initial
crossover probability to 0.8, the final crossover probability to 0.5, the initial point mutation
probability to 0.1, the final point mutation probability to 0.5, the initial shuffle mutation
probability to 0.1, and the final shuffle mutation probability to 0.8. This additional set of
parameters was used throughout the original results reported for the Matthews attack.
6.2 Classical Attack Results
As stated above, all classical attacks are mn until complete decryption of the ciphertext
is obtained. Since each ciphertext is different in both statistics and distribution of com
mon/uncommon words, the time needed to decrypt a text can vary widely. The more math
ematical an attack is, the shorter the period of time required.
Since a classical substitution attack is based on statistical information about the text,
as well as the user's intuition, the time this attack takes can vary widely from text to text.
Usually, a longer text is easier to decrypt, as the statistical characteristics are more distinct.
Some texts are statistically very well-defined, making them easy to decrypt even at shorter
text lengths. The first chapter of Genesis, for example, is easy to decrypt due to the clarity
of the statistical evidence. Other texts, that use less common words or word-patterns, such
as the Liberty or Death speech, are consistently difficult.
As Figure 6.1 shows, times can vary widely between texts, and between different
lengths of the same text. Times range from 1 :50 to 10:25, and can vary as much as 6:25 or
as little as :45 between different lengths of a text.
The classical Vigenere attack, on the other hand, is very mathematically based. This
means that the time to decrypt a text is much more consistent. Longer decryption times
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Figure 6. 1 : Classical Substitution Attack
mean that there was more than one good candidate for the period, leading to multiple
attempts at decryption. This is what occurred for most of the 100 character texts when a
period of 5 or 7 was used.
As Figure 6.2 shows, times are fairly consistent among different texts and text lengths.
Times range from :58 to 6:25, and vary as much as 4:55 or as little as :10 between different
text lengths.
The classical permutation attack is a bmte force, exhaustive search. Therefore, the
amount of time the attack takes depends both on the characteristics of the text and the
block length used. A longer block length takes more time to decrypt because there are
many more possibilities thatmust be considered and sorted through. Texts that contain less
common character combinations will take longer to decrypt because fewer permutations
result in that particular combination.
Figure 6.3 shows that this attack is more consistent for elapsed time values at smaller,
more trivial block lengths. At longer block lengths, it takes more time to sort through the
possible permutations to determine if a correct arrangement has been found. The word
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Figure 6.2: Classical Vigenere Attack
choice of the text can make it more difficult to determine if a correct permutation has been
found, since longer or less common words are more difficult to distinguish from a partial
root. Times range from :13 to :15 for texts at block length 2, :21 to :38 for texts at block
length 4, and 1:21 to 2:25 for texts at block length 6.
A classical columnar transposition attack begins with statistical analysis of the cipher-
text. The user then proceeds with anagramming, or rearranging the columns to produce
recognizable words. Like the classical substitution attack, a great deal depends on the
user's intuition. The more often easily recognizable words occur in the text, the easier
and faster the user can rearrange the columns correctly. The characteristics of the text,
therefore, are a significant factor in the length of time required to decrypt the text.
As shown in Figure 6.4, block length does not heavily influence the time it takes to
decrypt a text. The text attacked, and its length, are more influential factors. Times range
from :30 to 3: 15, with certain texts fairly consistently taking more time.
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Figure 6.3: Classical Permutation Attack
6.3 Genetic Algorithm Attack Results
Only the attacks on the monoalphabetic substitution, polyalphabetic substitution (i.e. the
Vigenere cipher), permutation and columnar transposition were selected for further inves
tigation. This includes the attacks by Spillman et al. (1993) [26], Matthews (1993) [20],
Clark (1994) [4], Clark et al. (1996)[8] / Clark & Dawson (1997) [5], Clark & Dawson
(1998) [6], and both attacks from Grundlingh & Van Vuuren (2002) [13].
The majority of the Genetic Algorithm based attacks did not correctly decrypt any
texts. Two of the attacks, Matthews (1993) [20] and Griindlingh & Van Vuuren (2002)
[13], decrypted some texts correctly. One attack, Clark (1994) [4] correctly decrypted
many texts. Only the three successful attacks will be discussed here, as time measurements
for the four unsuccessful attacks are irrelevant.
The Matthews (1993) [20] attack and the Grundlingh & Van Vuuren (2002) [13] at
tack were against the columnar transposition cipher, while the Clark (1994) [4] attack was
against the permutation cipher. The Matthews attack was successful only for key length
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Figure 6.4: Classical Transposition Attack
7; there were no successes at a keylength of 9 or 11. The per-text percentage of complete
breaks at key length 7 ranged from 0 % to 20 %, with most texts in the 2 to 4 % range.
Mutation and mating rates had little effect on decryption success, with more decryptions
occurring at larger population sizes and/or more generations.
The Grundlingh & Van Vuuren attack was also only successful at a keylength of 7. Per-
text decryption percentages at key length 7 ranged from 0 % to 28 %. The 100 character
text segments failed almost uniformly - there was one text of the five that was broken once,
giving it a success rate of 0.416 % as opposed to 0 %. Also, Chapter 1 of Genesis failed
to decode at any text length. The other 500 and 1000 character text segments achieved a
success rate of 20 % to 28 %. Mutation rate and type had no noticeable effect, and more
decryptions occurred with larger population sizes and/or more generations. A population
size of 50 resulted in decryption most of the time, as compared to the other population sizes
(10,20,40).
In comparison to the other attacks, Clark's attack of 1994 [4] was wildly successful.
A block length of 2 always decrypted, while block lengths of 4 and 6 had success rates
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ranging from 5 % to 91 %. Most of the per-text decryption percentages at block length 4
were in the high seventies or low eighties, while the percentages at block length 6 were
usually in the mid-forties. Overall, 66 % of the 100 character text tests, 73.5 % of the 500
character text tests, and 74.75 % of the 1000 character text tests were correctly decrypted.
As above, larger population sizes and/or more generations increased the decryption rate,
with no obvious effect from mutation rate. Block length 6 texts were especially sensitive
to the number of generations and population size, failing most of the time on a population
size of 10 or 20.
The effects of varying the population size and number of generations in this attack
(Clark 1994 [4]) are shown in the following graphs. The first set of graphs, Figures 6.5
through 6.8, show the effect of the number of generations on a specific population size.
This effect is independent of the block length used. Each graph shows all three block
lengths (2, 4, & 6), but the times are so close as to form one line when displayed on the
same graph. This set of graphs also illustrates the minimal effect of the mutation rate. Each
group of tests at 25, 50, 100, 200 or 400 generations, forms a plateau for time, indicating
that varying the mutation rate from 5 % to 40 % has no measurable effect.
The second set of graphs, Figures 6.9 through 6.13, show the effect of the population
size at a specific number of generations. Again, this effect is independent of the block
length used. Each graph shows all three block lengths, but only in Figures 6.9 and 6. 10 can
the difference between block lengths be seen. This visibility is due to the tiny range used in
these graphs - a maximum elapsed time of 0.65 or 1 .30 seconds. Again, the minimal effect
of mutation rate on the elapsed time is apparent.
Overall, these graphs show the expected effect of increasing the number of generations
or the population size - more time is required due to the larger pool of chromosomes that
need evaluation.
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6.4 Comparison ofResults
Overall, the GA-based methods were unsuccessful. Traditional methods took more time,
but were always successful. Only three of the seven GA-based attacks re-implemented
achieved any success. The successful attacks were on the permutation and transposition
ciphers.
The traditional attack on the transposition cipher produced elapsed times ranging from
:30 to 3: 1 5, with certain texts fairly consistently taking more time. It was successful 100 %
of the time, as is standard with a classical attack run to completion.
The two GA-based attacks on the transposition cipher were by Matthews [20] and
Grundlingh & Van Vuuren [13]. Both GA attacks were only successful at a key length
of 7. The Matthews attack achieved success rates of 2 - 4 %, on average. The Grundlingh
& Van Vuuren attack averaged success rates of 6 - 7 %.
The Matthews attack took from :00.05 to :06.27 in the tests run on the 100 character
texts, from :00.06 to :07.29 on the 500 character text tests, and from :00.08 to :07.46 on the
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1000 character text tests. These elapsed time values are dependent on the population size
and number of generations used in a given test. There is no correlation between elapsed
time and success rate.
The Grundlingh & Van Vuuren attack took from :00.00 (according to the resolution of
the measurement tool) to :01.21 in the tests run on the 100 character texts, from :00.00 to
:02.27 on the 500 character text tests, and from :00.00 to :02.99 on the 1000 character text
tests. Again, there is no correlation between elapsed time and success rate.
The GA-based attacks took much much smaller amounts of time to complete each test
run. At the tiny success rates these two attacks achieved, one success generally takes
more time to produce than running a traditional attack. At the 2 4 % success rate of
the Matthews attack, the test which took the longest time (:07.46) would need to be run
over and over for a total time of about 6:22 to produce one success. For the Grundlingh &
Van Vuuren attack, with the success rate of 6 7 %, the test which took the longest time
(:02.99) would need to be run multiple times for a total time of about :50. In both of these
estimates, it is assumed that success occurs randomly and spread evenly throughout the
tests, which is not the case in actual testing - the successful results tend to cluster together.
This being the case, it is not likely that either of the GA-based attacks will produce a result
faster than the traditional attack, in the typical case.
The classical permutation attack is a brute force, exhaustive search. Times range from
:13 to : 15 for texts at block length 2, :21 to :38 for texts at block length 4, and 1:21 to 2:25
for texts at block length 6.
The only GA-based attack on the permutation cipher was the Clark (1994) attack [4].
In comparison to the other attacks, this GA-based attack was wildly successful. A block
length of 2 always decrypted, while block lengths of 4 and 6 had success rates ranging
from 5 % to 91 %. Most of the per-text decryption percentages at block length 4 were in
the high seventies or low eighties, while the percentages at block length 6 were usually in
the mid-forties. Overall, 66 % of the 100 character text tests, 73.5 % of the 500 character
text tests, and 74.75 % of the 1000 character text tests were correctly decrypted.
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This attack took from :00.06 to :06. 12 in tests run on the 100 character texts, from
:00.08 to :07.96 on the 500 character text tests, and from :00.10 to : 10.25 on the 1000
character text tests. These elapsed time values are dependent on the population size and
number of generations used in a given test. There is no correlation between elapsed time
and success rate.
The Clark (1994) attack is very competitive with the traditional attack. The elapsed time
required is much smaller, and the success rates offer a excellent chance that this GA-based
approach will be faster than the traditional method, on average.
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Chapter 7
Extensions and Additions
There were three genetic algorithm attacks that achieved some success in decryption. These
attacks were:
Matthews'
[20] attack on the transposition cipher
Grundlingh and Van Vuuren's [13] attack on the transposition cipher
Clark's [4] attack on the permutation cipher
Since the Matthews [20] and Grundlingh & Van Vuuren [13] were only slightly suc
cessful, these attacks were re-run with larger population sizes and more generations, to
possibly improve success rates. The main problem with these two attacks, besides the low
rate of success, is that only a key length of 7 was successfully attacked. The Clark [4] at
tack was very successful originally, so an attempt was made to extend its success to larger
block sizes and to apply this attack to a different cryptosystem.
7.1 Genetic Algorithm Attack Extensions
The Matthews attack was successful only for key length 7 there were no successes at a
keylength of 9 or 11. The per-text percentage of complete breaks at key length 7 ranged
from 0 % to 20 %, with most texts in the 2 to 4 % range. Mutation and mating rates had
little effect on decryption success, with more decryptions occurring at larger population
sizes and/or more generations.
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The Grundlingh & Van Vuuren attack was also only successful at a keylength of 7.
Per-text decryption percentages at key length 7 ranged from 0 % to 28 %. The overall
average for success rate was in the 6 % to 7 % range. Mutation rate and type had no
noticeable effect, and more decryptions occurred with larger population sizes and/or more
generations.
In comparison to the other attacks, Clark's attack of 1994 [4] was wildly successful.
A block length of 2 always decrypted, while block lengths of 4 and 6 had success rates
ranging from 5 % to 91 %. Most of the per-text decryption percentages at block length 4
were in the high seventies or low eighties, while the percentages at block length 6 were
usually in the mid-forties. Overall, 66 % of the 100 character text tests, 73.5 % of the 500
character text tests, and 74.75 % of the 1000 character text tests were correctly decrypted.
As above, larger population sizes and/or more generations increased the decryption rate,
with no obvious effect from mutation rate.
7.1.1 Transposition Cipher Attacks
The two attacks on the transposition cipher were run with similar parameters. Population
sizes of 100 and 200 were used, in combination with 1,000, 5,000, or 10,000 generations.
The other parameters for each attack were:
Matthews
- A point mutation rate starting at 0. 1 and finishing at 0.5
- A shuffle mutation rate starting at 0.1 and finishing at 0.8
- A mating rate starting at 0.8 and finishing at 0.5
Grundlingh and Van Vuuren
- A mutation rate of 0. 10
- Mutation using both point and shift mutation
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As before, the following set of ciphertexts was used: Chapter 1 of Genesis from the
King James Version of the Bible [2], Patrick Henry's "Give me liberty or give me
death!"
speech [3], Section 1/Part 1 of Charles Darwin's The Origin ofSpecies [10], Chapter 1 of
H. G. Wells's The Time Machine [30], and Chapter 1/Part 1 of Louisa May Alcott's Little
Women [1].
Unfortunately, the larger values for the population size and number of generations did
not result in any improvement in the results. The success rate for the Matthews [20] attack
remained in the 2 % to 4 % range, while the rate for Grundlingh and Van Vuuren [13] was
in the 6 % to 7 % range. Again, only texts at a key length of 7 were decrypted.
7.1.2 Permutation Cipher Attack
The attack on the permutation cipher, Clark's 1994 attack[4], was extended to attempt
larger block sizes than before. To aid in this attempt, the parameter values were changed,
mostly to larger values. The parameters used were:
Block lengths of 8, 16, and 32
Population sizes of 50, 100, and 200
A number of generations of 200, 400, 1000 or 5000
A mutation rate of 0.001, 0.01, 0.05 or 0.10
The mutation rate parameter was the only one lowered. The mutation rates used in the
original versions of the genetic algorithm attacks are atypically high for genetic algorithm
applications. More common values are in the 0.001 and 0.01 range, so these values were
used in the extension of this attack.
Again, the following set of ciphertexts was used: Chapter 1 of Genesis from the King
James Version of the Bible [2], Patrick Henry's "Give me liberty or give me death!" speech
[3], Section 1/Part 1 of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species [10], Chapter 1 of H. G.
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Wells's The TimeMachine [30], and Chapter 1/Part 1 of Louisa May Alcott's Little Women
[!]
The attack was erratically successful on a block length of 8, slightly successful on a
block length of 16, and unsuccessful on a block length of 32. The ciphertext attacked
seemed to play a larger role in the attack's success. With a block length of 8, two cipher-
texts were not decrypted at all, 9 ciphertexts were decrypted more than 50 % of the time,
and 4 ciphertexts were decrypted anywhere from 12 % to 40 % of the time. The longer
texts (500 and 1000 characters) were attacked more successfully than the shortest text (100
characters). For a block length of 1 6, several successes were seen against two of the 1000
character ciphertexts. No attacks were successful against a block length of 32.
As before, mutation rate had no apparent effect, and a greater rate of success was
achieved among larger populations with many generations.
7.1.3 Comments
The two transposition cipher attacks do not justify writing this style of genetic algorithm at
tack in their current form. Their success rates are stable, but low, even with extraordinarily
large parameter values.
The permutation cipher attack is possibly worthwhile at small block lengths, probably
under 10 or so. It does not work at larger block lengths in its current form. This approach
would need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, in order to determine if this genetic
algorithm approach will be cost-effective in comparison with a more traditional, brute force
approach.
7.2 Additions
A new attack was implemented on the substitution cipher. Two variants of this attack were
tested. The difference between the variants was solely in the scoreboard used.
This attack is a conversion of the Clark [4] attack from the permutation cipher to the
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simple substitution cipher. The only changes made were those necessary to apply the attack
to a different cipher.
The original version of this attack used order-based GAs, since each chromosome rep
resented a permutation. Breeding was done using the position based crossover method for
order-based genetic algorithms. In this method, a random bit string of the same length as
the chromosomes is used. The random bit string indicates which elements to take from par
ent #1 by a 1 in the string, and the elements omitted from parent #1 are added in the order
they appear in parent #2. The second child is produced by taking elements from parent #2
indicated by a 0 in the string, and filling in from parent #1 as before. Two possible muta
tion types may then be applied. The first type is a simple two-point mutation where two
random chromosome elements are swapped. The second type is a shuffle mutation, where
the permutation is shifted forward by a random number of places. Either one or both of
these mutation types could occur, depending on the initial parameters. The population for
the next generation was produced by merging the parent and child populations and keeping
only the (population size) best solutions.
In order to apply this attack to a cipher that was not permutation-based, some changes
had to be made. The major change made was the conversion of the chromosomes from
numerical genes to alphabetical genes. Another change made was to allow both mutation
types to occur all the time - the input parameter previously present was removed. This step
was deemed reasonable as mutation type had no apparent effect in prior testing. Breeding
and new population creation occurred as before.
The difference between the two variants of the new attack is in the scoreboard used.
The first variant uses the same scoreboard as the implementation of Clark's [4] attack on
the permutation cipher. The second variant adds several additional items to the scoreboard.
The original scoreboard contains the digrams and trigrams TH, HE, IN, ER, AN, ED, THE,
ING, AND, and EEE. The variant scoreboard adds RE, ON, HER, and ENT, with the same
associated values standard on the original digrams and trigrams. These values are +1 for
digrams and +5 for trigrams. TH is +2 while EEE is -5.
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The original variant was attacked using the following parameters:
Population sizes of 10, 20, 40, and 50
Number of generations of 25, 50, 1 00, 200, and 400
Mutation rates of 0.05, 0. 1 0, 0.20, or 0.40
The variant with the extended scoreboard was attacked with these parameters:
Population sizes of 50, 100, and 200
Number of generations of 200, 400, and 1000
Mutation rates of 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, or 0.10
Both variants used the following set of ciphertexts: Chapter 1 ofGenesis from the King
James Version of the Bible [2], Patrick Henry's "Give me liberty or give me
death!"
speech
[3], Section 1/Part 1 of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species [10], Chapter 1 of H. G
Wells's The Time Machine [30], and Chapter 1/Part 1 of LouisaMay Alcott's Little Women
[1]-
Both attacks were completely unsuccessful. None of the ciphertexts were decrypted in
any of the tests.
7.2.1 Comments
This approach appeared promising at the outset. It achieved at least some success on both
the transposition and permutation ciphers. Additional modification of the parameters may
improve performance, but that seems doubtful given the complete lack of success displayed
in these tests. Another option would be to further tune the operators to the new cryptosys
tem.
If this attack had proved successful, it could have served as a springboard to attacking a
modern cipher such as DES orAES with a GA. These ciphers are based on substitution and
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permutation principles. It may have been possible to attack the components of the system
with a GA tuned for that component's cipher.
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Chapter 8
Evaluation and Conclusion
8.1 Summary
The primary goals of this work were to produce a performance comparison between tradi
tional cryptanalysis methods and genetic algorithm (GA) based methods, and to determine
the validity of typical GA-based methods in the field of cryptanalysis.
The focus was on classical ciphers, including substitution, permutation, transposition,
knapsack and Vernam ciphers. The principles used in these ciphers form the foundation
for many of the modem cryptosystems. Also, if a GA-based approach is unsuccessful on
these simple systems, it is unlikely to be worthwhile to apply a GA-based approach to
more complicated systems. A thorough search of the available literature resulted in GA-
based attacks on only these ciphers. In many cases, these ciphers were among the simplest
possible versions.
Many of the GA-based attacks lacked information required for comparison to the tra
ditional attacks. Dependence on parameters unique to one GA-based attack does not allow
for effective comparison among the studied approaches. The most coherent and seemingly
valid GA-based attacks were re-implemented so that a consistent, reasonable set of metrics
could be collected.
The main metric for both classical and genetic algorithm attacks was elapsed time. In
the classical algorithm case, the elapsed time was comprised almost completely of time
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spent interacting with the user, while in the genetic algorithm case, it was comprised al
most entirely of processing time. This difference in composition of elapsed time makes
it difficult to compare the attacks on a time basis. Therefore, an additional metric was
required.
The secondary metric used was the percentage of successful attacks per test set. Success
was defined as complete decryption of the ciphertext. This metric was only calculated for
the GA-based attacks, as a classical attack will run until the text is decrypted. A GA-based
attack, on the other hand, runs for a specific number of generations, independent of the
decryption of the ciphertext. Using this metric, as well as elapsed time, gives one a better
feel for the usefulness of each attack. The time measurement is irrelevant if the attack is
unsuccessful.
These two metrics were chosen so that traditional and GA-based attacks could be com
pared. Elapsed time measures the efficiency of the attack while the percentage of successful
attacks measures how useful the attack is. Both of these metrics are needed to gain a com
plete picture of an attack.
Of the twelve genetic algorithm based attacks found in the literature, seven were se
lected for re-implementation. None of the knapsack or Vernam cipher attacks were re-
implemented, for varying reasons. Of these seven, only three attacks were successful in
decrypting any of the ciphertexts. The successful attacks were those GA-based attacks on
the permutation and transposition ciphers. Clark's [4] GA-based attack on the permutation
cipher was by far the most successful. Both of the attacks which used a scoreboard for
fitness calculation, Matthews [20] and Clark [4], achieved at least some success. The third
successful GA-based attack was by Grundlingh and Van Vuuren [13], the only successful
attack to use a fitness equation. These three successful attacks were extended to further ex
amine their success rates. The two transposition attacks were tested using much larger pop
ulation sizes and numbers of generations, while the permutation attack was attempted on
larger block lengths. The two transposition cipher attacks obtained about the same success
rate as before, while the permutation cipher attack experienced decreased success. Since
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the scoreboard approach was successful in both cases it was used, this style of GA-based
attack was attempted on the monoalphabetic substitution cipher. The attack was based on
Clark's [4] attack, simply altered to apply to a different cipher. Unfortunately, this attempt
was unsuccessful. No ciphertexts were completely decrypted with either variant attempted.
8.2 FutureWork
There are several areas in which this work could be expanded. One of these is in the
investigation of the scoreboard approach to fitness calculation. This method achieved the
best results of the two methods used, yet does not seem to be in widespread use. Applying
this approach to other problems may prove useful.
A comparison of the scoreboard approach to the fitness equation approach in other ap
plications would be useful as well. This would determine whether the scoreboard approach
is limited to specific applications only, or if it has widespread applicability.
Another area for investigation is the use of less common fitness calculation measures.
The scoreboard approach, for example, proved useful in this application despite the rarity
of its use. Use of other seldom-used approaches may prove additionally valuable.
This work was coded in C and used perl/tcsh scripts. Re-working of the code to make
it modular and re-usable for other projects would be a useful extension.
8.3 Conclusion
The primary goals of this work were to produce a performance comparison between tradi
tional cryptanalysis methods and genetic algorithm (GA) based methods, and to determine
the validity of typical GA-based methods in the field of cryptanalysis.
The focus was on classical ciphers, including substitution, permutation, transposition,
knapsack and Vernam ciphers. The principles used in these ciphers form the foundation
for many of the modern cryptosystems. Also, if a GA-based approach is unsuccessful on
83
these simple systems, it is unlikely to be worthwhile to apply a GA-based approach to
more complicated systems. A thorough search of the available literature resulted in GA-
based attacks on only these ciphers. In many cases, these ciphers were among the simplest
possible versions.
Many of the GA-based attacks lacked information required for comparison to the tra
ditional attacks. Dependence on parameters unique to one GA-based attack does not allow
for effective comparison among the studied approaches. The most coherent and seemingly
valid GA-based attacks were re-implemented so that a consistent, reasonable set of metrics
could be collected.
The two metrics used, elapsed time and percentage of successful attacks, were chosen
so that traditional and GA-based attacks could be compared. Elapsed time measures the
efficiency of the attack while the percentage of successful attacks measures how useful the
attack is. Both of these metrics are needed to gain a complete picture of an attack.
Of the genetic algorithm attacks found in the literature, totaling twelve, seven were
re-implemented. Of these seven, only three achieved any success. The successful attacks
were those on the transposition and permutation ciphers by Matthews [20], Clark [4], and
Grundlingh and Van Vuuren [13], respectively. These attacks were further investigated in
an attempt to improve or extend their success. Unfortunately, this attempt was unsuccessful,
as was the attempt to apply the Clark [4] attack to the monoalphabetic substitution cipher
and achieve the same or indeed any level of success.
Overall, the standard fitness equation genetic algorithm approach, and the scoreboard
variant thereof, are not worth the extra effort involved. Traditional cryptanalysis methods
are more successful, and easier to implement. While a traditional method takes more time,
a faster unsuccessful attack is worthless. The failure of the genetic algorithm approach
indicates that supplementary research into traditional cryptanalysis methods may be more
useful and valuable than additional modification of GA-based approaches.
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